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Sprawl is an ill-defined and complex concept and this contributes to the difficulties in 
addressing it. Many studies and local policies are implemented without defining the very 
situation that is trying to be prevented. In this dissertation, I address this issue by 
computing and empirically testing a number of different measures that capture some of 
the elements of sprawl. While controlling for a number of other explanatory factors, I 
examine different fiscal factors that may contribute to the level of sprawl an area 
experiences. Because the property tax is the predominant source of local tax revenue, my 
main focus is on the impact that property tax rates have on sprawl in metropolitan areas. I 
next examine how the reliance on different types of revenue sources influence sprawl.  I 
then offer insight into how local governments may use this information to look at their 
own sprawl issues. I find that higher property taxes are found in areas with lower degrees 
of sprawl, but that greater property tax differentials result in more sprawl. 
 
Essay 2 
The second essay of this dissertation addresses one of the inefficiencies often attributed 
to sprawl: the increase in the cost of delivering public services. Although this is one of 
the most common complaints concerning sprawl, there have been few studies examining 
how sprawl impacts public service costs. Using the same sprawl measures as in the first 
essay, I examine how differing levels of sprawl impact the costs of not only total public 
service expenditures, but also a number of local services important to residents. With this 
essay, I contribute to the debate on the relationship between sprawl and public service 
costs. The results of this study show that sprawl has a very limited relationship with most 
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 People have been moving away from the cities in search of land, opportunity and 
a different way of life for many years. Perhaps one of the best-known examples of this is 
the settlement of the American West, where settlers left cities in the eastern U.S. and 
moved across the Great Plains to settle the western United States. However, this 
phenomenon is not unique to either those early times, or even the U.S.1 While the reasons 
behind this movement of the population in the U.S. have most certainly changed since the 
19th century, people still make choices as to where to live and how best to improve their 
quality of life through location decisions. As early as the 1930’s, the patterns of 
development that described the location decisions of people began to take on a negative 
connotation, and the development of suburbs and the exodus of people from the central 
cities to these outlying areas was described with a new term: sprawl. Earle Draper, the 
Director of Planning at the Tennessee Valley Authority said in 1937, “Perhaps diffusion 
is too kind of a word. ... In bursting its bounds, the city actually sprawled and made the 
countryside ugly...uneconomic [in terms] of services and doubtful social value.” 
 Since that time, the interest in sprawling development has not only grown, but has 
gained the attention of policymakers from the local level on up to a previous U.S. vice-
president. There are a variety of proposed solutions to sprawl, the most common being 
growth management laws, urban containment policies, and zoning restrictions. The irony 
is that as policymakers are formulating new ways to either stop, slow, or reverse sprawl, 
people are continuing to move to outlying suburban areas in record numbers.  
 As with any important issue, there are (at least) two sides to sprawl; there is the 
argument that this is a natural process, and people are simply behaving as utility-
                                                 
1 See Richardson and Bae (2004) for a discussion of sprawl in Western Europe.  
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maximizing rational agents. One might expect that as incomes rise and people become 
accustomed to a higher standard of living, they will seek out new opportunities and often 
those opportunities are found away from central cities: larger houses on larger lots of 
land, open space, better public schools, and in general, a higher quality of life. The other 
side of the issue is that these development patterns contribute to a number of 
inefficiencies: fiscal, social, and otherwise.  
 The discussion regarding sprawl continues, however, as many of the main issues 
associated with sprawl are still debated. Perhaps the most natural question to ask when 
attempting to discuss sprawl is what do we mean by sprawl? Sprawl is an ill-defined and 
complex concept and this contributes to the difficulties in addressing it. Many studies and 
local policies are implemented without defining the very situation that is trying to be 
prevented. In this dissertation, I address this issue by computing and empirically testing a 
number of different measures that capture some of the elements of sprawl. 
  The next logical question then, is what are the causes of sprawl? Federal policies 
often cited as contributors to sprawl are the federal development of the interstate highway 
system and the deduction of mortgage interest from the federal income tax bill.2 Other 
arguments maintain that sprawl is a product of lifestyles heavily reliant on automobiles.3 
While these may be contributors to sprawling development patterns, sprawl occurs at a 
local level, meaning it is prudent to examine local issues that may be impacting sprawl. 
While controlling for a number of other explanatory factors, I examine different fiscal 
factors that may contribute to the level of sprawl an area experiences. Because the 
                                                 
2 For a discussion on the impact of the federal highway system on sprawl see Rusk (1998); in their study 
Perskey and Kurban (2003) find that federal housing subsidies encourage sprawl. 
3 See Glaeser and Kahn (2004). 
 
 4
property tax is the predominant source of local tax revenue, my main focus is on the 
impact that property tax rates have on sprawl in metropolitan areas. I next examine how 
the reliance on different types of revenue sources influence sprawl.  I then offer insight 
into how local governments may use this information to look at their own sprawl issues.  
 The second essay of this dissertation addresses one of the inefficiencies often 
attributed to sprawl: the increase in the cost of delivering public services. Although this is 
one of the most common complaints concerning sprawl, there have been few studies 
examining how sprawl impacts public service costs. There have been case studies and a 
few simulations where different population densities are employed to assess how costs 
are influenced.  Using the same sprawl measures as in the first essay, I examine how 
differing levels of sprawl impact the costs of not only total public service expenditures, 
but also a number of local services important to residents. With this essay, I contribute to 
the debate on the relationship between sprawl and public service costs.    
 In the first essay, the dependent variable is the sprawl measure, and in the second 
essay the sprawl measure is one of the explanatory variables explaining local public 
service expenditures. Because of this interconnectedness, conceptually it is possible to 
model these questions in a simultaneous framework. However, a number of limiting 
factors make this particular type of modeling approach impractical, resulting in the 
separate analysis of these two particular questions. The first reason to look at these 
separately has to do with the fact that despite the potentially endogenous nature of the 
decisions being made (i.e. the decisions of choosing the property tax rate and the level of 
local public expenditure decisions), these are very much separate issues, and so I chose to 
treat them separately. The second reason is that there are no good instruments that will 
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allow me to identify the equations in the system. The final reason to separate these two 
questions, is the limitation of appropriate and available data. If I were to set this up as a 
simultaneous system, in the first essay, most of the data, including the property tax and 
demographic variables come from the Decennial Census and are available for 1990 or 
2000. A couple of the variables, however, are drawn from the Census of Governments, 
which to match up to the time frame I am analyzing, would use 1987 or 1997 data. When 
I move to the second equation, however, I am looking at how sprawl affects expenditures. 
Because of the availability of the expenditure data (which comes from the Census of 
Governments) the only expenditure years I could look at which would make sense are 
1992 and 2002. (Although it could certainly be argued that areas choose their property 
tax rates and make their expenditure decisions simultaneously, the data from the Census 
of Governments prohibit examining this question. My sprawl measure is for 1990 or 
2000, but expenditure data is available for either 1987/19987 or 1992/2002. Using the 
1987/1997 measure would not make sense; it is not possible for a future level of sprawl to 
have an impact on some previous expenditure decision.) Because of this, I chose to 
separate these two questions so each could be analyzed thoroughly.  
 
























“The rapid spread of suburbs across the previously rural landscape is a 
common phenomenon in the United States today.  Even the most casual 
observer cannot but be impressed with the magnitude of the changes.  
There has been much criticism, on aesthetic and other grounds, as to the 
kind of suburbs being built; they have also had their defenders, or at least 
those who say the results cannot be hopelessly bad because people still 
move in great numbers to the suburbs” (Clawson, 1962, p.99). 
 
 While this quote aptly describes the U.S. today, economist Marion Clawson made 
this observation about the changing landscape more than forty-five years ago. In the years 
since Clawson wrote about sprawl, the issue has continued to gain attention and is at the 
forefront of issues facing rapidly growing areas.  Individuals, communities, planning 
commissions, state and local governments, and other groups have an interest in how 
communities and regions are growing and developing.  Burchell et al. (1998) and 
Johnson (2001) note that some of the reasons for the interest in sprawl include: aesthetics 
of the developing area, excessive reliance on automobiles, decay of the central city, loss 
of open space, loss of agricultural or farmland, influence on community character, air and 
water pollution and other environmental impacts, health consequences for residents, and 
fiscal impacts on the community.   
 Many of the current definitions of sprawl found in the literature are either too 
subjective or too vague to be useful for empirical research.  In order to examine causes of 
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sprawl, it is necessary to operationally define the term sprawl in a way that is reasonably 
accurate and acceptable, yet still conducive to empirical research. One way this research 
contributes to the current literature is by testing a unique measure of sprawl, a spatial 
Gini coefficient. A Gini coefficient is a common way to measure concentration, most 
often the concentration of income, or wealth. In the current research, I construct a spatial 
Gini coefficient to measure how people are distributed across a given land area; where 
there is less concentration of people, there is a higher level of sprawl. 
There are a number of ways local policy choices may contribute to sprawl; I focus 
on one key component of local fiscal policy, the property tax rate, and also gauge the 
relative reliance local governments have on different sources of revenue. Examining 
property tax rates is appropriate because they are the largest component of both local 
general revenue and local tax revenues. In 2005, local property tax revenue across the 
U.S. on average accounted for 72 percent of total local tax revenue; ranging from a high 
of 98 percent in New Hampshire local governments, to a low of 26 percent in the District 
of Columbia.4 Brueckner and Kim (2003) theoretically examine the impact of property 
taxes on sprawl and find two separate (and opposing) impacts, so the net theoretical result 
is ambiguous. Although the reliance on different sources of revenue may also impact 
sprawl, the issue has received scant attention in the literature. Because theory does not 
provide a definite, clear answer, empirical research is needed to determine to what extent 
local property tax rates and reliance on different sources of revenue impact sprawl.  
                                                 




 This study results in numerous contributions to the literature and is valuable in a 
number of ways.  First, there are few recent empirical studies on the causes of urban 
sprawl and only a handful that examine the property tax and the fiscal variables of 
interest, so this research analyzes sprawl using more current data. Second, the research 
relies on different measures of sprawl than those previously used. In addition to the 
spatial Gini measure I use for sprawl, I also construct two additional measures of urban 
sprawl to use as robustness checks: an index of dissimilarity and a sprawl indicator. The 
index of dissimilarity is a common demographic measure examining the way groups are 
distributed across the component geographic areas that make up a larger area (i.e. how 
people are distributed among census tracts across a metropolitan area).  The sprawl 
indicator measure is another way of analyzing how people are distributed across an area 
based on differing levels of high and low-density areas.  
The different sprawl measures proposed in this study have not been used 
empirically before, and improve upon previous measures in a number of ways. First, 
these different measures of sprawl are based on very small units of geography (the census 
tract) allowing for a measurement of sprawl that is much richer in detail than those used 
in previous studies. Second, both the spatial Gini measure and the index of dissimilarity 
are well-regarded measures commonly used to analyze a number of different issues, 
including the distribution of wealth or the diversity of race in a community. Finally, by 
using three different, yet somewhat related measures of sprawl, I am able to assess how 
sensitive empirical results are to the measure of sprawl used.  
 Although the influence of many of the explanatory variables on sprawl has been 
studied, little attention has been paid to the reliance on property and sales taxes, and the 
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effective property tax rate in an MSA. As local areas experience increasing sprawl it 
makes sense to examine local factors that may act as contributors. The results of my 
study indicate that after controlling for a number of factors that impact sprawl, higher 
effective property tax rates coincide with lower degrees of metropolitan sprawl. 
Likewise, a stronger reliance by metropolitan areas on property tax revenue as a share of 
total local tax revenue is found in areas with lower degrees of sprawl, and higher reliance 
on sales tax revenue slightly increases the level of sprawl. One possibility for these 
results is that in areas where the tax base is less mobile, higher property tax rates may be 
levied, these areas may also rely more heavily on property taxes as a source of revenue. 
Because sales and property taxes are the two largest components of total local tax 
revenues, an area with a higher reliance on property tax revenues would necessarily rely 
less heavily on sales tax revenues, so the results are consistent. 
 The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 1.B describes the relevant 
literature, and Section 1.C contains the discussion of the measures of sprawl used. The 
theoretical structure and empirical methodology are discussed in Section 1.D, followed by 
descriptions of the data in Section 1.E. Results are presented in Section 1.F and Section 1.G 
concludes.  
1.B Relevant Literature 
 
Because this paper focuses on understanding and explaining the relationship 
between a variety of explanatory variables and sprawl; I examine three aspects of the 
literature. First, I discuss the theoretical treatment of sprawl in economics.5 The second 
                                                 
5 A number of fields address sprawl, including urban planning, transportation, and geography. 
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issue I address is the way that sprawl has previously been defined and quantitatively 
measured. Since there is a lack of consensus on the definition, it is necessary to assess 
how previous studies have estimated sprawl. Finally, the relationship between fiscal 
choice variables (i.e. property taxes and reliance on different sources of revenue) and 
sprawl is addressed.  
Urban Economic Theory and Sprawl 
 
Suburbanization (the term traditional economic theory uses to refer to sprawl) is 
the movement of residents and jobs away from the central city, and is a natural outcome 
based on the monocentric city model.  The monocentric city model is a city with a central 
business district (CBD) where all employment is located surrounded by a residential ring 
where all housing is located. In the model, each of the homogenous households in the city 
receives utility from a numeraire good and their consumption of housing (where the lot 
size of their residence has an inverse relationship with the distance to the CBD). Taking 
into account rent and commuting costs, consumers choose their consumption of housing 
(i.e. location) in order to maximize utility. As one moves out from the CBD, rent falls 
thereby allowing for greater consumption of housing, while incurring greater commuting 
costs. Alonso (1964) first described this model and Muth (1969), Mills (1972), and 
Wheaton (1974) extended the basic model in a variety of ways.  
Building upon the results of the monocentric city model, Mieszkowski and Mills 
(1993) discuss two theories of suburbanization that have emerged in urban economics: 
flight from blight and natural evolution. The natural evolution theory emphasizes the 
distance of residential sites to central work places, the effects of rising real incomes over 
time, the demand for new housing and land, and the heterogeneity of the housing stock.  
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Also included in and important to this theory are transportation costs, innovations of 
intra-urban transportation and changes over time in the comparative advantage of 
different income groups at commuting longer distances to work.  The important result of 
the natural evolution theory is that suburbanization is a natural occurrence resulting from 
higher incomes and increasing population, improvements in transportation, and 
competition in the market for undeveloped land.  
Rising real incomes encourage residents to increase their demands for new 
housing and more land; because of this desire for larger houses on larger lots, many 
residents choose to move out to suburbs. The heterogeneity of housing stock also 
encourages residents to move outward from the central cities, as the desire and demand 
for different types of housing is sought, in part due to rising incomes. In a similar fashion, 
the improvements in transportation infrastructure and the decrease in transportation costs 
have also influenced the movement of people away from the central cities. Both of these 
reduce the costs and difficulties in traveling further distances, making commuting longer 
distances not only more feasible, but less costly as well.  
 The flight from blight theory has its roots in Tiebout’s (1956) “voting with the 
feet” hypothesis and stresses the fiscal and social problems of central cities such as high 
taxes, low quality public schools and other public services, racial tensions, crime, 
congestion, and low environmental quality as possible reasons city residents choose to 
relocate to suburban locations.  Mieszkowski and Mills conclude that both the natural 
evolution and flight from blight approaches are important in explaining suburbanization.   
Poor central city conditions have historically encouraged those citizens who were 
more affluent to flee for the suburbs. In the early development of urban economic theory, 
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the central cities were the core of development, and therefore the first places to generally 
suffer from poor conditions. Higher tax rates encouraged those residents who were 
financially well off to move out to the suburbs where they can purchase larger homes, 
and because of lower tax rates in suburban areas, still have lower tax bills. Central cities 
have historically had higher rates of crime, minorities, and poor public services, all of 
which encouraged those residents who were capable of moving away to do so.  
Brueckner and Fansler (1983) is one of the few empirical investigations of those 
factors that contribute to urban sprawl. Viewing sprawl as the result of market processes 
allocating land between urban and non-urban uses, the spatial sizes of urban areas are 
determined.  Using a regression analysis of 40 Census-defined U.S. urbanized areas in 
1970, the monocentric model is empirically tested. The authors find that nearly 80 
percent of the variation in the size of urban areas is explained by variables of the 
monocentric model. Brueckner and Kim find that higher levels of population and 
personal income increase sprawl, while higher values of agricultural land decrease 
sprawl. The proxies for commuting cost are not statistically, significantly different from 
zero in either specification. Because the results are consistent with the predictions of the 
monocentric city model, the authors conclude that “the results of this paper justify a 
dispassionate view of sprawl, (p.481)” and therefore, in their view, sprawl should not be a 
cause of concern.  
Defining Sprawl 
 
The complexities surrounding urban sprawl may be most evident when attempting 
to define it. Every person with an interest in sprawl likely has their own definition (even 
if implicit), and while there are generally agreed upon components to sprawl, there is no 
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consensus as to what it is.  Malpezzi (2001) notes situations often associated with sprawl 
such as high reliance on automobiles/low incidence of public transportation, loss of farms 
and open space, and fiscal impacts. Malpezzi views these situations as consequences of 
sprawl, rather than as defining attributes of sprawl. However, as one begins to delve 
deeper into the issues surrounding sprawl, it becomes clear that the defining attributes 
and consequences of sprawl are not easily disentangled. Galster (2001) notes that this is 
one of the most common problems found in the definitions of sprawl in the literature: 
sprawl is described as both the cause and result of some urban process. The nature of this 
entanglement between causes and consequences makes any study of sprawl complicated- 
from the difficulty in defining sprawl to the challenge of appropriately testing potential 
causes and effects of sprawl.    
A variety of definitions for sprawl are present in the economics literature; several 
are discussed below. A number of authors present good conceptual definitions and 
analyses of the many issues often associated with sprawl without providing a solution to 
the problem of how to measure sprawl. Nechyba and Walsh (2004) define sprawl as an 
“expanding urban footprint,” and Brueckner (2000) notes that sprawl can accurately be 
thought of as “excessive suburbanization.” While the ideas of both the expanding urban 
footprint and excessive suburbanization are common conceptualizations of sprawl, it is 
unclear as to how these concepts can be measured. Discussions of sprawl from the early 
economic literature such as Clawson (1962), and Harvey and Clark (1965) reveal that 
some of the early criticisms of the analyses of sprawl, most notably the lack of a clear and 
measurable definition, remain relatively unchanged today.     
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Defining a complex idea such as sprawl results in definitions that are difficult to 
measure and capture in an operational definition, while other definitions are more 
appropriately considered either a cause or a consequence of sprawl, and therefore not the 
definition of sprawl. The land area of the Urbanized Area is not a good measure of sprawl 
because it does not describe the distribution of population within its boundaries, a 
common (and useful) component of many sprawl definitions. It is possible that the 
distribution of population within two equally sized Urbanized Areas could be quite 
different, and for this reason, area may not be the best way to measure sprawl.6 For 
example, in 2000, the Miami and Washington D.C. Urbanized Areas had similar areas,7 
1,116 and 1,156 square miles, respectively. But Miami has nearly 1 million more 
inhabitants than Washington D.C., resulting in drastically different average densities. 
Miami’s population of 4,919,036 results in a density (as measured by people per square 
mile) of 4,408, while Washington D.C.’s population of 3,933,920 results in a density of 
3,403.  So while these two areas contain similar land area, their differing populations give 
a much different picture as to the overall average density of these two areas. Another way 
to look at how the use of the size of Urbanized Areas may be a misleading measure of 
sprawl is to look at two areas that have similar average densities, yet different land areas. 
Portland, ME and Valdosta, GA have virtually identical average densities (1,519 people 
per square mile in Portland, 1,520 in Valdosta) yet Portland’s population and land area 
are more than triple those of Valdosta. The use of land in the Urbanized Area would give 
identical sprawl measures for these two places. 
                                                 
6 Another potential problem in using the Urbanized Area is that Census re-defined this geography in 2000, 
and earlier definitions are no longer comparable to the new definition, making comparisons across time 
impossible.  
7 See http://www.census.gov/geo/www/ua/ua2k.txt  for data on Census-defined Urbanized Areas in 2000. 
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Wassmer (2006) uses the Urbanized Area to explore the expanding geographic 
footprints discussed in Nechyba and Walsh (2004), but does not consider this 
measurement sprawl and notes the problem discussed above. Using this measure as a 
proxy for sprawl could potentially be misleading; while this measure is capable of 
capturing the concept of the expanding areas, it doesn’t lend any insight into the density 
or the distribution of the population within the urbanized area, as in the previous 
examples of Miami and Washington, DC. My proxy for sprawl, discussed in detail in the 
next section, improves on the urbanized area measure using detailed census tract data to 
analyze the distribution of the population within a given area.    
 Other proxies for sprawl measure the movement in population from the central 
city to the urban fringe. Carruthers (2003) uses the percentage of total population growth 
occurring at the urban fringe and Dye and McGuire (2000) measure the share of the 
population outside the urban core relative to the total population of the metro area. 
Measurement of population movement toward the suburbs captures the expanding 
footprint concept but fails to capture any associated density changes. As cities (or urban 
areas) develop, the natural process of city expansion usually consists first of outward 
expansion, and then as development progresses, the entire area undergoes increased 
density. Different measures of land use constitute other common measures of sprawl: 
Dye and McGuire (2000) use the share of urbanized land area relative to total 
metropolitan land area and the annual growth in urbanized land area. Carruthers (2003) 
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and Fulton et al. (2001) calculate population density, dividing population by urbanized 
land area8 as another possibility for measuring sprawl.   
The Property Tax and Sprawl 
 
  Brueckner and Kim (2003) theoretically examine the connection between the 
property tax and urban sprawl. In their analysis, the property tax has two possible (and 
opposing) effects on urban spatial expansion. In the first effect, the property tax is viewed 
as a tax imposed equally on both land and capital improvements to the land.  The tax on 
improvements to the land (the improvement effect) tends to lower the equilibrium level 
of improvements the developer chooses; this reduction in the intensity of land 
development results in the property tax increasing sprawl.  
  The second effect contradicts the previous result, and arises due to the impact the 
property tax has on the size of dwellings (the dwelling-size effect).  If one argues that the 
tax on land and structures is passed on to consumers, then the price of housing increases, 
which leads to a decrease in the size of dwellings. Smaller dwellings imply an increase in 
population density thereby reducing the city’s spatial area (and sprawl). The increase in 
density resulting from smaller dwellings may offset the decrease in density resulting from 
fewer improvements; the combined theoretical analysis reveals that the effect of the 
property tax is ambiguous.  If the improvement effect is stronger, then the property tax 
may encourage sprawl; but if the dwelling size effect dominates, then the property tax 
may reduce sprawl. Assuming constant elasticity of substitution preferences in housing 
                                                 
8 Urbanized land area data are available from the USDA Natural Resources Inventory.  Because of the 
sampling procedure used in obtaining the data, the county-level data may contain large errors, resulting in 
overestimating the amount of the urbanized land. The overestimation of this measurement of land area 
would likely result in overstating the degree of sprawl. More information on the NRI data can be found 
here:  http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/TECHNICAL/NRI/1997/docs/1997CD-UserGuide.doc . 
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consumption (and an elasticity of substitution greater than or equal to one) results in 
higher-density, smaller, less-sprawled cities. However, the results of their numerical 
simulation indicate the likely influence of the property tax is a slight increase in sprawl. 
Because of the inconclusive theoretical results, empirical analysis is necessary.  
  Expanding the work of Brueckner and Kim (2003), Song and Zenou (2006) 
further develop the theoretical model, and are the first to empirically test the impact of 
property tax rates on sprawl. Theoretically, they use a log-linear utility function where 
the elasticity of substitution is variable (and greater than one), as opposed to the CES 
assumption of Brueckner and Kim. Song and Zenou’s theoretical treatment shows that 
increasing the property tax rate decreases the size of the city, and therefore, they argue, 
sprawl. However, they use the land area of the Census-defined Urbanized Area as the 
measure of sprawl in their empirical analysis, which while not uncommon,9 is not the 
best way to measure sprawl for the reasons noted above.   
Using geographic information systems (GIS) methods, Song and Zenou (2006) 
calculate effective property tax rates for 448 Census-defined Urbanized Areas in 2000.  
McGuire and Sjoquist (2003) note that sprawl and property taxes may be endogenously 
determined; sprawl can affect property taxes through its impact on the property tax base 
and the property tax base may influence the choice of a property tax rate. It is also 
possible that the property tax rate influences the tax base, which in turn influences the 
degree of sprawl. One possibility is that areas with a less mobile tax base can implement 
a higher property tax rate. Previous empirical studies have not attempted to address the 
potentially endogenous nature of sprawl and property taxes, but Song and Zenou 
                                                 
9 See Brueckner and Fansler (1983) and Nelson (1999). 
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incorporate an instrumental variables approach to address simultaneity bias. Using state 
aid to education as the instrument, and controlling for a number of factors, their two-stage 
least squares analysis reveals that higher property tax rates result in smaller urbanized 
areas, and in their view, less sprawl.   
Prior to the work of Brueckner and Kim (2003) and Song and Zenou (2006), there 
was little exploration of the relationship between the property tax and sprawl. A few 
exceptions include Harvey and Clark (1965) who discuss how the real property tax 
results in discontinuous development, and Clawson (1962) who suggests raising property 
taxes as a way to decrease (or at least slow) development.  In examining population 
growth at the urban fringe, Carruthers (2003) finds mixed results relating per capita 
property tax revenues and infrastructure investments to sprawl. His conclusion regarding 
the property tax is that it may not contribute as much to sprawl as previously thought, 
although this conclusion is based on property tax revenues rather than rates.  
Fiscal Structure 
I now turn my attention to fiscal structure and the impact it may have sprawl. The 
relationship between an area’s fiscal structure and a number of topics has previously been 
explored. Fox, Herzog, and Schlottman (1989) look at the impact fiscal structure has on 
migration into and out of metropolitan areas. They examine a number of variables related 
to fiscal structure: the property, sales, and income tax revenues as a percent of local own-
source revenues are measures of the tax structure of the metropolitan area. Other revenue 
sources include intergovernmental transfers, local own-source, and state own-source 
revenue per dollar of income, and they also include a mix of expenditure variables likely 
to influence migration are analyzed, as well.  Gerking and Morgan (1998) look at the 
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relationship between state and local fiscal structure and state economic development 
policies, and Fox and Murray (1990) look at how local public policies, including tax 
structure, influence business development decisions. A number of studies contained in 
Herzog and Schlottman (1991) discuss the relationship between business decisions and 
local policies, including taxes.  There are not, however, many empirical studies of how 
public policies in general and tax structure specifically may influence an area’s degree of 
sprawl. Further, to this author’s knowledge, a theoretical analysis between the fiscal 
structure and the level of sprawl in an area does not exist.   
There are a number of ways that metropolitan fiscal structure may influence the 
level of sprawl; Wassmer (2002) and (2006) examines these potential relationships on a 
subset of western metropolitan areas. Using the non-central place10 dollar value of retail 
sales as his measure of sprawl, Wassmer (2002) examines how a state’s reliance on 
different sources of revenue impacts sprawl. He examines how reliance on sales, 
property, and revenue from “other” taxes influences sprawl. Wassmer argues that greater 
reliance on a revenue source that is likely to generate a fiscal surplus (such as sales tax) is 
expected to increase the amount of retail sprawl, so a positive influence is expected from 
sales and other tax revenues. As discussed previously the property tax may have a 
positive or a negative impact on sprawl. Wassmer finds that the property tax revenue has 
no impact on non-central place retail sales, and state-wide sales tax and other taxes have 
the expected positive impact. Wassmer (2006) expands the sources of state-wide revenue 
he examines by adding income tax revenues to the different sources he examined in 2002.  
                                                 
10 The non-central place (or to use terminology consistent with the monocentric, the central city) dollar 
value of retail sales is defined as follows. First, total retail sales for an entire Urban Area are calculated, and 
then the Census-designated central place dollar value of retail sales is subtracted. The remaining value is 
the value of retail sales occurring outside the central place.  
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Estimating a number of different specifications, he again finds that sales tax revenue is 
positive and significant, and in one specification revenue from other taxes is negative and 
significant; none of the other revenue sources are significant in any of the specifications.  
The revenue sources I examine differ slightly from those used by Wassmer; he 
examines state-wide reliance, while I analyze the influence of metropolitan-level sales 
and property tax revenue as shares of local general revenue. Following the logic used 
with the effective property tax rate, the expected sign on the property tax share is 
ambiguous. Using the same reasoning as Wassmer, and assuming that areas that rely 
more heavily on sales tax revenue do so in order to benefit from the fiscal surplus that is 
generated, I expect the sign of the sales tax revenue to be positive.  
1.C Sprawl 
 
A spatial Gini coefficient, constructed from Census tract data,11 is the main 





(αXij –αXij-1) (αYij+αYij-1)  
where  
Gj=is the spatial Gini measure for MSA j (j=1, 2, …306) 
αXij =the cumulative tract population percentage of tract i in MSA j, and  
αYij= the cumulative tract land area percentage of tract i in MSA j.  
Examples of the calculation of the spatial Gini and a simple numerical example 
are shown in Tables 1-1 and 1-2 and Figures 1-1 and 1-2. Graphically, the Gini 
                                                 
11 A number of authors have used census tract data to construct measures of sprawl; see Malpezzi and Guo 
(2001), and Brueckner and Largey (2006) for examples. 
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Coefficient is the area of concentration between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect 
equality (denoted by area A), and the value is calculated as A/(A+B) in Figure 1-1. By 
definition, areas that are more sprawled will be closer to the line of perfect equality, as 
shown by scenario 2 in Figure 1-2. Areas with less sprawl will be closer to the line of 
perfect inequality, as shown by scenario 1 in Figure 1-2.  (Figures and tables are located 
in the appendices.) 
The Gini coefficient is commonly used to examine the distribution of income, but 
some authors have begun to use this measure in a spatial context (Tsai, 2005; Malpezzi 
and Guo, 2001). Recall that the Gini coefficient measures the degree of dispersion of a 
variable, most commonly income or wealth although it can easily be extended to gauge 
the population dispersion. The Gini coefficient has values between zero and one; a value 
of zero indicates that there is perfect equality in the variable being measured (no 
concentration) and a value of one indicates that there is perfect inequality (complete 
concentration). In the case of sprawl, the 45 degree line (the case of perfect equality) 
represents the case of “extreme” sprawl, where people are distributed equally across the 
land area of an MSA. Calculating the spatial Gini using the equation above resulted in a 
sprawl measure where higher values (i.e. closer in value to 1) were indicative of lower 
levels of sprawl. To make the sprawl Gini more intuitively pleasing, as well as to ease the 
interpretation of this measure, I subtract the value of the sprawl Gini from 1. Upon 
completing this transformation, the higher the value of the sprawl Gini (i.e. the closer in 
value to 1), the higher the degree of sprawl the MSA has.  
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This variable is chosen to approximate residential sprawl for MSAs for a variety 
of reasons. First, the lack of reliable, detailed data for different geographic areas is 
problematic when attempting to measure sprawl quantitatively. As discussed previously, 
the definitions of MSAs and Urbanized Areas can change, making comparisons over time 
problematic. The measure I use incorporates detailed land and population data at the 
census tract level; this data is available for all MSAs. Further, unlike other Census-
defined regions, census tracts are relatively stable over time, so overall, they are a 
constant geographic entity. Second, the sprawl Gini relies on data that are consistently 
reported, whereas some data sources are either inconsistent over time, or not gathered on 
a regular basis.  The data used to construct the index are from the 1990 and 2000 
Decennial Censuses and consist of the county the tract is in, the population and the 
estimate of land area for each tract.   
The Gini coefficient is a good measure of sprawl for a number of reasons. First, 
this type of measure is capable of capturing the distribution of people within an MSA, 
allowing greater insight into the spatial pattern of people than, say, an average density 
measure. Second, because of its design it is not necessary to make judgments as to the 
high-density/low-density cut-off points problematic in the work of Galster et al. (2001) 
and Lopez and Hynes (2003). In both of these studies, the degree of sprawl is determined 
by the decision of what is considered a high density tract and what is considered low 
density. The problem arises in choosing this cut-off point for high and low densities, 
Lopez and Hines (2001) use 3,500 people per square mile, which is a very high density. 
Even the density chosen by Galster et al. (2001) is somewhat high, in their study, they 
use the Urbanized Area minimum density of 1,000 people per square mile. Finally, 
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because the sprawl Gini is constructed from a stable Census defined area, the census 
tract, it is possible to calculate the Gini over time for a number of different geographic 
areas including MSAs.   
As with any measure attempting to capture sprawl, the Gini coefficient does have 
some limitations. The measure does not tell us where the inequality of people is (i.e. 
central city, suburbs, or exurbs).  The Gini allows only a general statement of the 
sprawling condition of the MSA, and not specifically where more or less sprawl may be 
occurring. When examining sprawl, a more detailed measure is generally preferred, 
however, data limitations determine the detail available for a sprawl measure. Galster et 
al. (2001) chose an extremely detailed measure with very few observations (13 MSAs are 
included), while Song and Zenou (2006) chose a much simpler measure (land area of 
Urbanized Area) with more observations (448 Urbanized Areas).   
The sprawl Gini is the primary sprawl measure of interest in my paper, however, 
for comparison, as well as to test the robustness of the econometric specification, two 
other measures are employed. Closely related to the Gini coefficient is the Index of 
Dissimilarity (ID) which is calculated using the following formula: 
IDj = 0.5 Σ (Xi – Yi),  
where  
IDj= the Index of Dissimilarity for MSA j (j=1, 2, …306) 
Xi= the percentage of population in tract i in MSA j, and  




  This measure12 represents how dissimilar the population is from the line of perfect 
equality, and like the Gini Coefficient, is bounded by zero and one, with higher values 
(closer to 1) representing higher levels of sprawl. For a general discussion of the Index of 
Dissimilarity, see Sakoda (1981), Watts (1998) for a discussion of how the Index of 
Dissimilarity has been used to examine the segregation of the genders in different 
occupation, and Iceland, Weinberg and Steinmetz (2002) for a special report by the 
Census Bureau on racial and ethnic segregation in the U.S.  
 The final measure used in this paper is a sprawl indicator first proposed by Lopez 
and Hynes (2003) which also uses census tract data. The sprawl indicator is calculated 
using the following formula:  
    SIj = Dj / Mj 
where  
SIj = the sprawl indicator for MSA j (j = 1,2…306) 
Dj = population residing in low densities tracts in MSA j. 
Mj =total population residing in MSA j. 
In this paper, the cut-off point for the high-density/low-density tracts for the 
sprawl indicator is the land-weighted average density for the MSA. The cut-off point is 
an important choice as it will directly influence the degree of sprawl measured in an 
MSA. The indicator ranges from 0 to 1, where a score of 0 indicates that everyone in the 
MSA lives in a high-density tract, and a score of 1 indicates that everyone in the MSA 
lives in a low-density tract. Using this measure, the higher the value of the sprawl 
                                                 




indicator (the closer in value to 1), the higher the degree of sprawl in the MSA; likewise, 
the closer the value to 0, the lower the degree of sprawl in the MSA.  
 As mentioned previously, this measure may be problematic because it requires a 
decision to determine the necessary condition for a high density tract versus a low density 
tract. By using the land-weighted average density for each MSA as the cut-off point, I 
attempt to take into account the uniqueness of each MSA. By land-weighting the average, 
I acknowledge the fact that the land areas of Census tracts are not equal and can vary 
widely, even within the same county.13 If differences in land-weights are unaccounted 
for, this sprawl index treats each census tract as being essentially the same size, and for 
this reason, may introduce measurement error into the indicator.  Although the three 
measures result in different values for a given area, the scale of each is the same; and the 
higher the value, the higher the level of sprawl. 
These sprawl measures improve upon previous measures in a number of ways.  
First, the data used to construct each are publicly available for all MSAs allowing for a 
large number of observations.  Second, although population changes impact the average 
density, it is not certain how the new population distributes itself throughout the MSA. 
The MSA is a grouping of counties designated by the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), based on a number of economic linkages, including work flow patterns. 
Because these counties are related to each other not only geographically, but also 
                                                 
13 A census tract is a small subdivision of a county, and is designed to be relatively permanent. Census 
tracts do not cross county boundaries and generally contain between 2,500 and 8,000 people; they can vary 
widely in their size because they are delineated based on density. When first formed, tracts are designed to 
be as homogeneous as possible regarding characteristics of the population, however over time, census tracts 
do become more heterogeneous as their densities change. In rare cases, census tracts can be split or 
combined due to extreme changes in density from the initial formation. More detailed information about 
tracts can be found here: http://www.censusbureau.biz/geo/www/cen_tract.html. 
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economically, it makes sense to evaluate them as one unit. Using a continuous measure of 
sprawl, such as the measures proposed above is helpful because sprawl is not a 
dichotomous measure and therefore is properly gauged as a matter of degree. All three of 
the sprawl measures proposed allow measurement of the changes not only in the degree 
of sprawl in an MSA over time, but can also be reconstructed to conform to any future 
definitional changes of the MSA. Finally, by examining the values of each of the 
measures for a given area it is clear that each is different, and so may pick up different 
aspects of sprawl.  
 Table 1-3 contains the values for each of the three sprawl measures for all MSAs 
in 1990 and 2000. Table 1-4 contains the correlation coefficients between the three 
measures of sprawl used in this paper; there is a very strong positive relationship between 
the sprawl Gini, the Index of Dissimilarity, and the Sprawl Indicator.  
In 1990, the average values for the Gini coefficient, Index of Dissimilarity, and 
the Sprawl Indicator are 0.259, 0.376, and 0.225, respectively. In 2000, the values are: 
0.270, 0.388, and 0.227.  Although the values between 1990 and 2000 are remarkably 
similar, the increase in the average values indicates a trend toward more sprawling 
populations, however of the 306 MSAs for which data were collected, 201 became less 
sprawled between 1990 and 2000, while 105 became more sprawled. This indicates the 
increase in sprawl, on average, was greater than the decrease in sprawl during this 
decade. Table 1-5 shows the three sprawl measures for the metropolitan areas with the 
lowest sprawl measurements in 1990 and 2000.  It is important to note that all of the 
measures of sprawl used in this paper should be interpreted as a matter of degree rather 
than as an absolute measure. For example, in 1990, the Casper, WY MSA had a Gini 
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coefficient of 0.042, where the low value is indicative of relatively low levels of sprawl; 
however by 2000, the Gini value had increased to 0.116, a substantial increase in the 
Gini, indicating that this MSA had become more sprawled during the 90s.  (It is 
important to note in this case, that although the Casper, WY MSA experienced an 
increase in its sprawl based on it’s Gini value, overall it maintains a relatively low degree 
of sprawl, much lower than the average MSA.) The Tucson, AZ MSA had a Gini value of 
0.065 in 1990 and a value of 0.056 in 2000, indicating that this MSA had become less 
sprawled between 1990 and 2000.  
Table 1-6 shows the sprawl values for the highest sprawl metropolitan areas in 
1990 and how the measurement changed by 2000.   Following the same logic as above, 
one can see that the Gadsden, AL MSA became more sprawled (increasing from a Gini 
value of 0.443 in 1990 to a value of 0.484 in 2000) and the Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, 
NC MSA became less sprawled.  
1.D Modeling Framework 
 
  Following the work of Brueckner and Fansler (1983), Mieszkowski and Mills 
(1993), and Song and Zenou (2006), and using the unique measures of sprawl discussed 
in the previous section, the degree of an area’s sprawl is measured. I then assess the 
impact of property taxes, and a number of explanatory variables from the monocentric 
model, flight from blight and the natural evolution theories. A separate analysis gauges 
the impact of the reliance on sales and property tax revenues. As discussed in Brueckner 
and Kim (2003), the property tax may have two possible (and opposing) effects on the 
degree of sprawl in an area, and therefore the expected outcome is ambiguous.   
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The baseline model I estimate uses the instrumental variables approach in a fixed 
effects panel framework. In the first stage of the model, the endogenous explanatory 
variable of the equation (effective property tax rate) is regressed on all the exogenous 
variables in the reduced form, and fitted values are obtained. The first stage of the model 
is expressed in the equation below:  
 zjt=β0 + βxjt + π1Vjt + ejt  
where zjt is the endogenous property tax rate, Vjt is a vector of three instrumental 
variables, and xjt are the exogenous explanatory variables (discussed in detail below).  
The second stage of the model uses the predicted values of z (
^
z jt),  from the first 
stage regression to get unbiased estimates of the coefficients. This stage is shown in the 
equation below, 
Yjt = α + βxjt +δ
^
z jt + ejt 
 
 where j and t are MSA and time indices, Yjt is the sprawl Gini; zjt is the endogenous 
explanatory variable, the effective property tax rate; and xjt is a vector of explanatory 
variables including: population of the MSA, percentage growth of the MSA population 
over the previous decade, land area of the MSA, the market value of agricultural land, 
central city share of non-white population, average home price in the MSA, state-level 
tax burden, MSA level of personal income, the share of the population under age 18 in 
public school, the standard deviation of the property tax rate, a dummy for the Census 
region14 and ejt is the error term. The instruments15 chosen for this estimation are: the 
                                                 
14 The Census regions and their component states are located in the Appendix. 
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state share of the state and local general revenue, the central city poverty rate, and the 
level of intergovernmental aid from the state to local areas.  Statistically, these 
instruments are correlated with the effective property tax rate; yet do not appear to have a 
direct impact on sprawl.  
  If, as McGuire and Sjoquist (2003) suggest, the level of sprawl and the effective 
property tax rate are indeed endogenously determined, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
results in coefficients that are biased and inefficient. The instrumental variables (IV) 
approach using two-stage least squares (2SLS) is an appropriate method to address the 
endogeneity of an explanatory variable. The key to successfully employing the IV 
approach is finding an appropriate instrument;16 because sprawl is the dependent variable 
in the model I estimate, an appropriate instrument will be correlated with the property tax 
rate, yet have no effect on the sprawl measure.   
  A number of econometric issues must be taken into consideration in order to 
appropriately estimate the relationship between property tax rates and urban sprawl. In 
the presence of heteroskedasticity, the IV estimates of the standard errors are 
inconsistent; whereas the coefficients are consistent, yet inefficient.17 Further, if 
heteroskedasticity is present, the common tests for endogeneity as well as 
overidentification of the model are not valid. If heteroskedasticity is deemed present, then 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Some of the instrumental variables tested but not used in the analysis are: intergovernmental revenue 
from the state to local areas for education, educational attainment, the share of the population under age 18 
in public school, state sales tax as a share of general revenue, MSA level tax burden, and state tax burden. 
These possibilities for instruments either did not explain the effective property tax, or were highly 
correlated with sprawl, and therefore inappropriate instruments. 
16 I use the Sargan-Hagan test to gauge the appropriateness of the instruments. The joint null hypothesis is 
that the instruments are valid, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are 
correctly excluded from the estimated equation. I fail to reject the null at the 1% significance level, 
indicating that the instruments are appropriate.  
17 See Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003) for a detailed treatment of the instrumental variables approach.  
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an appropriate method to use is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM); however if 
heteroskedasticity is not present, then the IV approach is appropriate. Therefore, the first 
step is running a test to determine whether heteroskedasticity may be present. The 
Bruesch-Pagan test is used to detect heteroskedasticity; the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity cannot be rejected at the 1% level of significance. These results imply 
that heteroskedasticity is unlikely to occur in the estimation, and IV is the appropriate 
methodology to use.  
 In addition to the structure of the variance, it is also necessary to address whether 
the theoretically endogenous regressor is truly endogenous. If the property tax rate is not 
endogenous to the model, then OLS is the appropriate model to use. Hausman test results 
indicate that the null hypothesis of exogeneity can be rejected at the 5% level of 
significance. This result confirms that the property tax rate is endogenous, and should be 
treated as such, therefore the IV approach is appropriate. 
1.E Data 
 
 The data consist of two time periods,18 1990 and 2000; a number of models are 
run, and those results are discussed later in the chapter. The complete dataset includes 
30619 MSAs; covering the entire country except New England.20 Because the county 
components of MSAs change over time, it was necessary to choose a period on which to 
                                                 
18 Because the data is a two-period panel, the fixed effects estimation produces identical results to a first-
differenced model. 
19 Although data were collected for 306 MSAs, all multi-state MSAs were excluded from the analysis, 
because different states may have different tax structures. 
20 The New England MSAs are excluded because their counties are not comparable to the rest of the 
country, and in New England, townships are the primary local governments, and county governments have 
virtually no role. MSAs are aggregations of counties, so it was not appropriate to include New England.   
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base the definition, and the MSA definitions as of June 30, 1999 were chosen.21 The 
MSAs were reconstructed for 1990 based on the 2000 definition. Because the definitions 
of MSAs change over time, if one consistent time period is not used, then a true analysis 
of how sprawl changes over time cannot be measured. For example, the Knoxville MSA 
had seven component counties in 1990: Anderson, Blount, Grainger, Jefferson, Knox, 
Sevier, and Union.  By 1999, the Knoxville MSA had only six counties, but a number of 
the component counties had changed: Grainger and Jefferson were no longer part of the 
MSA, and Loudon county was added. If the definitions were not consistent across time, 
an analysis of the Knoxville MSA would include 7 counties in 1990 and 6 in 1999, of 
which only 5 are found in both years. There are a number of potential problems arising 
from definitional changes. The first, and potentially most problematic issue is that any 
changes in sprawl would not necessarily be due to changes in the location of people, but 
rather could arise due to the addition or removal of component counties. Choosing a base 
year as the definition allows for consistent comparisons across time. Additionally, the 
data on central cities are based on the June 30, 1999 definition.    
 Many of the explanatory variables are for the same year as the sprawl Gini, while 
the property tax information is reported for the previous year.22 Table 1-7 contains the 
sources of data used in the analysis, a brief description and the expected effect on sprawl; 
descriptions of the instruments and the source notes are in Table 1-8. Summary statistics 
for the data are contained in Table 1-9. My empirical construct tests variables from four 
                                                 
21 See http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/metro-city/99mfips.txt  for a complete listing of MSAs 
and their component counties. This was the definition used for Census 2000. 
22 The Census long form questionnaire asked homeowners to report real estate taxes paid for the year prior 




theories: the flight from blight theory, the natural evolution theory, predictions of the 
monocentric city model, and the impact of property tax rates. Sprawl can be described as 
the spatial outcome of a number of different influencing factors, which fall into the four 
main categories described below. 
Effective Property Tax Rate 
The MSA average effective property tax rate is calculated from U.S. Census data; 
the long form of the Census questionnaire asked homeowners to report both the amount 
of real estate tax they paid as well as the value of their home in the year prior to the 
Census. The amount of the property tax paid divided by the reported value of the home 
aggregated to the MSA level is the effective property tax rate. Theory is unclear as to the 
expected sign of the property tax rate on sprawl, therefore, the predicted impact remains 
ambiguous. Since property tax rates are not levied at the MSA level, but rather at sub-
MSA level jurisdictions the effective property tax rate reflects the average rate in the 
MSA. 
 In addition to the effective property tax rate I also gauge the impact of another 
related measure: the standard deviation of the property tax rate in each MSA. By 
incorporating the standard deviation of the property tax in each MSA, I am somewhat 
able to assess how differences of tax rates within an area may influence sprawl. 
Presumably, the larger the deviation, the more sprawl an area might experience.  
Monocentric City Model 
 A number of variables described in the monocentric city model are also 
appropriately incorporated into a model explaining sprawl. The population level for the 
MSA is collected from Census files, and it is expected that higher populations will tend to 
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increase the sprawl in an area.23 There are a number of reasons for this assumption but 
the main idea is that as populations increase, central cities and suburbs will tend to be 
more heavily populated, and people will move further and further out, in search of more 
space and less congestion. The Census of Agriculture provides a variety of information 
on farms and agricultural land; I use the market value of agricultural land per acre as a 
proxy for the cost of converting land. This variable is prominent in urban economic 
theory and is expected to have an inverse relationship with sprawl; that is, the higher the 
value (price) of agricultural land, the lower the level of sprawl because less land will be 
converted into non-farm uses. 
Natural Evolution Theory 
The next group of variables in the empirical model fall under the natural evolution 
theory, which emphasizes the rise of real incomes, the demand for new housing, and the 
heterogeneity of the housing stock. The average home price in the MSA is calculated as 
the total value of homes (as reported by homeowners) divided by the total number of 
homes, and is expected to have an inverse relationship with sprawl. Higher average home 
prices may also capture the dwelling-size effect of Brueckner and Kim (2003), where 
higher property tax rates are passed on to consumers through higher home prices, and less 
sprawl is expected to result. Historically, people left central cities for suburbs because 
homes were not only cheaper in these areas, but residents were able to buy larger homes 
on larger plots of land. Total personal income in the MSA is expected to have a direct 
relationship with sprawl; as people’s incomes increase, their tastes and demands change 
                                                 
23 See Brueckner and Fansler (1983). 
 
 35
and not only are they more likely to demand larger homes and better schools, but they are 
also better able to afford their changing preferences.  
Flight from Blight 
 Also called the fiscal-social choice theory, the flight from blight theory is an 
extension of Tiebout’s model. The central city non-white population as a share of the 
total central city population is a direct test of the “flight from blight” theory and is 
expected to have a direct relationship with sprawl; the higher the percentage of the non-
white population living in the central city, the more sprawl an area is expected to have. 
The number of municipalities is included as it directly relates to Tiebout’s hypothesis that 
people move in response to greater choice in the number of possible jurisdictions when 
deciding where to locate. The expected sign of the number of municipalities is positive, 
that is, the more choices available to residents within an MSA, the greater the sprawl an 
area will experience. 
 Other variables are included in the empirical specification that do not clearly fall 
into one theoretical category, but intuition suggests that they may have an impact on 
sprawl. The variable measuring the share of the population under age 18 attending public 
school might be expected to increase the amount of sprawl in an area. As Tiebout 
suggests, different quality schools may influence where people choose to reside. More 
children in the public school system may result in congestion which may have an impact 
on the quality of education. This may induce parents to seek out schools where the 
quality is at least perceived to be better.  
 The monocentric city model includes a measure of the population level, however, 
it is possible that population growth might play a role in sprawl as well. For this reason, 
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the population change during the previous decade is included.  Because the sprawl 
measures used in this study focus on the distribution of people, rather than the absolute 
level of residents, it is unclear how population growth may influence the different sprawl 
measures, therefore the expected sign is ambiguous. I also include the land area of the 
MSA, in order to test whether geographic size has any influence on sprawl. However, the 
expected sign is ambiguous, because it is unclear how the Gini measure will be impacted 
by land area. A final variable included in the model is the state-level tax burden, which is 
total state taxes divided by total state personal income. With this variable, I attempt to 
capture the general tax climate of the state. The expected sign is ambiguous, as it is 
unclear how the state-wide tax burden impacts sprawl. 
1.F Empirical Results 
 
I estimate the baseline model using an instrumental variables approach in a fixed 
effects panel framework with the Gini sprawl measure as the dependent variable. A 
number of empirical specifications are estimated in order to determine the appropriate 
model to use to explain the relationship between sprawl and the explanatory variables 
discussed above. In addition to the baseline model, I estimate the IV separately for 1990 
and 2000. The results for the first and second stage of the baseline model24 are shown in 
Table 1-10 and the discussion follows. Elasticities from the fixed effects regression are in 
Table 1-11.  
                                                 
24 A customary way to determine whether a fixed or random effects model is appropriate is a Hausman 
specification test. The Hausman specification test compares the results of the consistent fixed effects model 
with the efficient random effects model. The null hypothesis is that the unobserved group-specific effects 
are uncorrelated with the other regressors. In the presence of such correlation the estimators from the 
random effect model will be biased, so the fixed effect model is preferred. I reject the null at the 1% level 
of significance, indicating that the fixed effect model is statistically the appropriate choice. 
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 In this specification, a number of the explanatory variables are significant and of 
the expected sign. The primary variable of interest in the model is that of the effective 
property tax rate. Recall that because of the two possible and opposing effects, the 
expected sign of the effective property tax rate is ambiguous; the negative sign of the 
empirical results indicate that as the property tax rate increases, the value of the Gini 
coefficient decreases (which indicates a lower degree of sprawl in an area).  The results 
of this variable indicates the dwelling-size effect of Brueckner and Kim (2003) has a 
stronger impact than the improvement effect, and confirms the theoretical extension and 
empirical test by Song and Zenou (2006), that is, that lower levels of sprawl occur in 
areas with higher property tax rates. This is a potentially important result to local 
governments concerned with the impact property taxes have on the degree of sprawl in 
local areas. For local areas interested in decreasing the extent of sprawl, property tax rates 
may be one fiscal policy choice worth examining.25  
The standard deviation of the property tax displays a positive and statistically 
significant sign, indicating that greater variation of property tax rates within an MSA 
leads to increasing sprawl. It is not clear whether high tax rates attract or repel residents. 
It could be argued that residents flee high tax areas, in search of lower tax jurisdictions. 
On the other hand, the Tiboutian argument that people seek out the jurisdictions that best 
satisfy their demand for public services may be in play here. In this case, it may be 
                                                 
25 Although the results of the Hausman test indicate that the property tax is endogenous and should be 
treated as such, I also estimated an OLS model to gauge the consequences of ignoring the endogeneity. 
Failure to account for the endogeneity of the effective property tax rate gives different results than the IV 
regression; many of the explanatory variables fail to be significant, including the average home price in the 
MSA and the total number of municipalities. Both the effective property tax rate and the standard deviation 
of the tax rate within the MSA fail to be statistically significant at any reasonable level. This is an 
important result; addressing the endogenous nature of the property tax is crucial to the outcome of the 
estimation.    
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possible that higher property tax areas attract residents, in part due to a possible 
perception that higher property tax rates are indicative of better quality public schools (or 
public services in general). Reinforcing the Tiebout idea is the positive and significant 
result of the number of municipalities in an MSA. This indicates that the more choices 
people have in where to live, the more sprawled an MSA will be.  
 The average home price is negative and statistically significant. This is the 
expected result; an area with a higher overall level of home prices may not supply enough 
incentive for residents move to suburban locations as is typical in a monocentric city 
framework. Recall, that in the monocentric model, residents who choose to live further 
out, are generally rewarded with lower home prices. 
 The population growth over the previous decade is negative and significant, 
indicating that the higher growth in the previous decade, the less sprawl an MSA 
experiences. While this result might seem counterintuitive, there is no reason to expect 
the sprawl Gini sprawl to be influenced by population growth, but rather by the 
distribution of people. The result of this variable shows that when areas experience higher 
population growth, the population tends to settle into more concentrated distributions 
across the MSA. The state-level tax burden has a negative and significant impact, 
meaning that the higher the state tax burden, the less sprawl there will be. This result may 
be working in a similar fashion to the property tax rate; because the state-level tax burden 
is constant across the state, there is no incentive to move elsewhere (within the state) to 
reduce these taxes.  
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Alternative Modeling Strategies 
 I next estimate the models separately for each year using the IV approach, to 
assess how looking at the relationship between property tax rates and sprawl change in a 
cross-section framework. Results from the regressions are in Table 1-12. Overall, the 
model does a better job of explaining sprawl in 2000 than 1990. This may be due to the 
artificial construction of the MSAs in 1990; it was necessary to use a definition for only 
one time period in order to have a consistent definition of MSAs over the two periods. 
Likewise, several central city designations changed between the two time periods, in 
most cases, an additional central city was added between 1990 and 2000. However in 
order to have comparable central cities and MSAs, it was necessary for them to be 
consistent over time. It is possible, though, that re-creating the definition in 1990 resulted 
in some measurement error at the MSA level.  
 Many of the variables remain significant in the cross-sectional IV framework, and 
no statistically significant variables change sign. The elasticities for the effective property 
tax rate in this specification are much larger than the fixed effects framework; in 1990 the 
elasticity is -0.360 and in 2000 is -0.630.  In the fixed effects framework, the property tax 
elasticity is -0.070. Many of the variables are only significant in one of the time periods: 
in 1990 the state tax burden variable is positive and significant, while land area is 
negative and significant, while in 2000, population change is positive and significant 
while the average home price is negative and significant.  
 It is possible that the effective property tax rate (as well as the standard deviation 
of the property tax rate) have different influences on sprawl depending on the size of the 
MSA. I estimate the fixed effects model and break the MSAs into two population 
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categories:  placing all MSAs with populations of half a million or less into one category 
and all MSAs with populations over half a million into another. The regression results are 
shown in Table 1-13. When broken down by these population categories the property tax 
fails to be significant in the large MSAs, but is significant for the smaller MSAs. The 
standard deviation of the property tax rate fails to be significant for the small MSAs but is 
positive and significant for those MSAs with populations of greater than half a million.   
 The results of this partitioning suggest that Tiebout effects are likely in effect for 
the more populous MSAs; that is, areas that have greater populations also have greater 
choice as to where to live. This Tiebout-type effect is shown in the significance of the 
standard deviation of the property tax rate in large MSAs. The property tax rate may not 
be significant in large MSAs because high housing prices might prevent the property tax 
from being considered in the choice of where to live. The significance of the property tax 
rate for smaller MSA suggests that the dwelling size effect dominates for smaller areas, 
that is, higher property tax rates are taken in to consideration by residents who make their 
housing choices accordingly.  The standard deviation of the property tax rate is not 
significant, likely because smaller areas contain fewer possibilities of where to live, so 
the tax differential does not matter as much. The remaining explanatory variables 
generally retain their significance from the baseline model, however, in many cases 
previously explanatory variables are no longer significant.   
Robustness Checks 
 In order to check the robustness of the model, I re-estimate the baseline model but 
substitute the Index of Dissimilarity and the Sprawl Indicator for the sprawl Gini as the 
dependent variable. The results using the Index of Dissimilarity and the Sprawl Indicator 
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do not perform as well in the fixed effects context as the estimation using the Gini. In 
each of the models, only three variables are significant, although they do display the 
expected signs. The effective property tax rate, the state-level tax burden, and the average 
home price in the MSA all display negative and significant signs. For the property tax 
rate and the average home price, the value of the coefficientsd with the sprawl Gini as the 
dependent variable are in the middle, with the Index of Dissimilarity as the lower bound 
coefficient estimate and the Sprawl Indicator as the upper bound estimate. This situation 
changes with the state tax burden, where the sprawl Gini specification results in the 
largest coefficient.  The results of these regressions are in Table 1-14.  
 These results appear to indicate that when modeling the relationship between 
potential explanatory variables and sprawl, the choice of the sprawl variable matters. The 
fact that the effective property tax rate is significant and negative across all specifications 
is important, although the potential impact of the tax rate varies by the model and the 
specification.  
Fiscal Structure 
 The final model I estimate is one where rather than looking at the influence 
property tax rates have on sprawl, the reliance on sales and property tax shares are 
analyzed. Using a similar model and panel structure as the baseline model, I estimate the 
impact of these two variables, the results are in Table 1-15. I find that when these two 
variables are estimated in separate regressions the share of the property tax is negative 
and significant while the share of sales tax revenue is positive and significant.  
 This is a potentially important finding, because it adds another dimension to the 
previous results based on property tax rates. Higher property tax rates coincide with 
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lower areas of sprawl, and a higher reliance on property taxes as a major source of 
revenue also coincides with lower levels of sprawl. If one thinks of local revenue as a pie, 
then in most areas, sales tax revenue and property tax revenue would be the largest pieces 
of the pie. Holding the overall size of the pie constant, if one of these shares increases, 
then the other share must experience a decrease. In fact, if we look at the coefficients for 
the property tax share (-0.207) and the sales tax share (0.297), one can see that they 
nearly offset each other, and move in opposite directions.  
 The two variables cannot be estimated jointly, however, because the collinearity 
is too great between them. The results from this estimation may indicate that areas do 
actively pursue those types of activities that result in a fiscal surplus as Wassmer 
suggests, and the result of the reliance on property tax revenues may work in a similar 
fashion to property tax rates, that is, areas that rely more heavily on property tax revenues 
may experience Brueckner and Kim’s (2003) dwelling-size effect. However, because the 
reliance on property and sales tax revenues are determined jointly, it may not be 
appropriate to model them in separate equations, and therefore, these results should be 
interpreted with caution. The model performance is fairly poor, with a low R2 value and 
very few significant variables, although those that are significant are of the expected 
signs.  
 There are a couple of reasons that the analyses for the fiscal structure of an MSA 
do not produce significant results. First, it is possible that an area’s fiscal structure has 
relatively little to do with the tendency to sprawl. On a somewhat related note, it is also 
possible that smaller areas than an MSA would need to be examined in order to find if 
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there is a relationship between tax reliance and sprawl. Wassmer used the state-wide 
level, and this study used the metropolitan level and both resulted in similar results.  
1.G Conclusions  
 
 The conclusions of this study provide evidence that the property tax does indeed 
influence sprawl. In the theoretical model of Brueckner and Kim (2003) this means that 
the dwelling-size effect dominates, and therefore higher property tax rates are often found 
in areas with lower degrees of sprawl.  As most local government officials are well 
aware, the property tax is one of the least popular taxes,26 and increasing rates to dampen 
the effect of sprawl would not only be an unpopular decision, but also not feasible since 
property taxes are assessed at city and/or county-levels, and not the MSA. It may be the 
case that areas with high property tax rates have higher taxes overall, providing residents 
not only with higher levels of public services but also perhaps with less variation of 
public services. Less variation in public services within a metropolitan area may reduce 
the need for residents to move in search of a different menu of public services, and 
therefore result in a lower degree of sprawl. The positive results of the measure of the 
standard deviation of the property tax indicate that property tax differentials may increase 
the level of sprawl an area experiences, as residents seek out the jurisdiction that best 
satisfies their preferences, and as residents sort themselves into these communities, the 
area will experience more sprawl. 
                                                 
26 Kincaid and Cole (2005) analyze public opinion on multiple areas of federalism-related issues in 2005 
comparing the results with findings from previous years. The local property tax is consistently identified as 
one of the top two worst taxes.  
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 One issue of interest that arises from this research is the notion of how Tiebout 
sorting may impact the sprawl process. Greater differentials in the property tax rate 
increase sprawl so the efficiency gains of the market for public services may be offset (at 
least to some extent) by negative externalities associated with sprawl. Examples of 
possible externalities include: poor or reduced air quality, health impacts, and increased 
congestion. This result may be of particular interest to areas where there are large tax 
differentials in neighboring areas, or a large number of communities with different 
offerings of public services which may induce residents to sort themselves within an area 
according to their preferences and the services offered.   
 Links between sprawl and obesity, or public health in general could be analyzed 
using the sprawl measures developed here. Likewise, a number of environmental impacts, 
such as air and water quality, congestion, and traffic and commuting issues could be 
examined, in addition to other measures commonly used to gauge environmental health.   
 One additional avenue for research is updating this study once data from Census 
2010 are available. Because the sprawl measures are based on stable geographic units, an 
additional year of data could be added maintaining consistency among the definitions of 
MSAs and central cities. The study would then span thirty years and perhaps give greater 
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1 200 100 0.38 0.07 0.38 0.07 0.07 0.38 0.03 
2 150 200 0.28 0.13 0.66 0.20 0.13 1.04 0.14 
3 100 300 0.19 0.20 0.85 0.40 0.20 1.51 0.30 
4 75 400 0.14 0.27 0.99 0.67 0.27 1.84 0.49 
5 5 500 0.01 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.33 1.99 0.66 
Total 530 1500 1.00 1.00      
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Table 1-3: Metropolitan Areas, Gini Coefficients, Index of Dissimilarity, and Sprawl Index Values, 
1990 and 2000 
MSA Gini ID 
Sprawl 
Index Gini ID 
Sprawl 
Index 
 1990 1990 1990 2000 2000 2000 
Abilene, TX MSA 0.1562 0.2499 0.1904 0.1758 0.2432 0.1598 
Albany, GA MSA 0.2318 0.3799 0.2654 0.2635 0.4027 0.2084 
Albany--Schenectady--Troy, NY 0.2527 0.3853 0.2523 0.2616 0.3901 0.2534 
Albuquerque, NM MSA 0.0773 0.1739 0.1064 0.07 0.1729 0.0928 
Alexandria, LA MSA 0.301 0.4284 0.3294 0.3322 0.4646 0.3665 
Allentown--Bethlehem--Easton, 0.3074 0.4402 0.2904 0.3175 0.4557 0.267 
Altoona, PA MSA 0.3895 0.4968 0.4297 0.3738 0.4805 0.3492 
Amarillo, TX MSA 0.0843 0.158 0.102 0.1031 0.194 0.1109 
Anchorage, AK MSA 0.0884 0.1893 0.1174 0.0862 0.1725 0.105 
Anniston, AL MSA 0.4389 0.5271 0.3314 0.4397 0.5386 0.343 
Appleton--Oshkosh--Neenah, WI 0.2804 0.3771 0.2913 0.2827 0.3915 0.2632 
Asheville, NC MSA 0.3774 0.5409 0.3071 0.4029 0.5638 0.2832 
Athens, GA MSA 0.3541 0.5012 0.2784 0.3697 0.5072 0.2994 
Atlanta, GA MSA 0.3398 0.4819 0.2491 0.3724 0.5107 0.248 
Auburn--Opelika, AL MSA 0.3403 0.4544 0.2776 0.3729 0.484 0.2827 
Austin--San Marcos, TX MSA 0.1969 0.3245 0.1973 0.2163 0.3475 0.189 
Bakersfield, CA MSA 0.1306 0.2224 0.1738 0.1113 0.2003 0.1435 
Baton Rouge, LA MSA 0.2904 0.4398 0.2317 0.3156 0.4631 0.2074 
Beaumont--Port Arthur, TX MSA 0.1935 0.348 0.1447 0.2177 0.3744 0.1738 
Bellingham, WA MSA 0.1553 0.2571 0.0332 0.1865 0.2622 0.0384 
Benton Harbor, MI MSA 0.4169 0.5381 0.3652 0.4313 0.5509 0.3781 
Billings, MT MSA 0.1416 0.1786 0.1545 0.1398 0.2106 0.1865 
Biloxi--Gulfport--Pascagoula, 0.2495 0.3551 0.1902 0.2814 0.4084 0.2457 
Binghamton, NY MSA 0.3397 0.4693 0.3618 0.3482 0.4685 0.3716 
Birmingham, AL MSA 0.2942 0.413 0.2726 0.3266 0.4515 0.2916 
Bismarck, ND MSA 0.1388 0.2369 0.1839 0.1297 0.1846 0.1088 
Bloomington, IN MSA 0.3122 0.3984 0.2396 0.2879 0.3847 0.2308 
Bloomington--Normal, IL MSA 0.2596 0.3183 0.2558 0.2298 0.3291 0.2621 
Boise City, ID MSA 0.1642 0.2909 0.1705 0.1924 0.313 0.1616 
Brownsville--Harlingen--San B 0.2537 0.395 0.2891 0.2632 0.3987 0.2785 
Bryan--College Station, TX MS 0.2088 0.2531 0.1965 0.1979 0.2852 0.2009 
Buffalo--Niagara Falls, NY MS 0.246 0.3772 0.2107 0.2681 0.4056 0.2183 
Canton--Massillon, OH MSA 0.3011 0.4468 0.2253 0.3083 0.4434 0.209 
Casper, WY MSA 0.0415 0.1233 0.0768 0.1157 0.1131 0.1016 
Cedar Rapids, IA MSA 0.2258 0.3336 0.1853 0.2347 0.3386 0.1901 
Champaign--Urbana, IL MSA 0.2268 0.2925 0.1912 0.2362 0.31 0.2085 
Charleston--North Charleston, 0.2349 0.344 0.1958 0.2294 0.3535 0.1998 
Charleston, WV MSA 0.3862 0.4996 0.3355 0.3922 0.5045 0.3163 
Charlottesville, VA MSA 0.3556 0.474 0.3282 0.3679 0.4901 0.2995 
Cheyenne, WY MSA 0.1171 0.1266 0.1068 0.1875 0.1568 0.1379 
Chicago, IL PMSA 0.217 0.3644 0.1434 0.2393 0.3966 0.1596 
Gary, IN PMSA 0.3302 0.4451 0.1679 0.3201 0.4506 0.1888 
Kankakee, IL PMSA 0.3645 0.4722 0.3642 0.3752 0.4864 0.3788 
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Kenosha, WI PMSA 0.3088 0.4264 0.34 0.3406 0.4806 0.322 
Chico--Paradise, CA MSA 0.2371 0.3748 0.262 0.2317 0.3632 0.2408 
Hamilton--Middletown, OH PM 0.3409 0.4713 0.23 0.3669 0.5089 0.2169 
Akron, OH PMSA 0.3697 0.5084 0.3075 0.3882 0.5335 0.2895 
Cleveland--Lorain--Elyria, 0.2469 0.3811 0.1803 0.2668 0.4008 0.1796 
Colorado Springs, CO MSA 0.1256 0.239 0.1359 0.1444 0.2507 0.1426 
Columbia, MO MSA 0.3075 0.401 0.2502 0.3281 0.4228 0.2831 
Columbia, SC MSA 0.3136 0.4289 0.2437 0.3467 0.4624 0.2595 
Columbus, OH MSA 0.2293 0.3518 0.2076 0.2436 0.3677 0.1915 
Corpus Christi, TX MSA 0.121 0.2103 0.0797 0.1365 0.2231 0.079 
Corvallis, OR MSA 0.2077 0.2621 0.1451 0.2007 0.256 0.1372 
Dallas, TX PMSA 0.1891 0.3083 0.1391 0.2032 0.3235 0.1378 
Fort Worth--Arlington, TX P 0.2154 0.3389 0.1653 0.2361 0.3589 0.1728 
Danville, VA MSA 0.3725 0.5002 0.367 0.4035 0.5393 0.4062 
Dayton--Springfield, OH MSA 0.2978 0.4317 0.2073 0.3136 0.4454 0.2165 
Daytona Beach, FL MSA 0.2324 0.3559 0.1583 0.2682 0.3951 0.1868 
Decatur, AL MSA 0.4094 0.5504 0.3372 0.413 0.555 0.3418 
Decatur, IL MSA 0.2731 0.3455 0.2485 0.2809 0.3602 0.2631 
Boulder--Longmont, CO PMSA 0.1728 0.3104 0.1668 0.181 0.3234 0.1212 
Denver, CO PMSA 0.1282 0.213 0.0814 0.1247 0.2284 0.075 
Greeley, CO PMSA 0.1236 0.2835 0.1066 0.1415 0.2839 0.1069 
Des Moines, IA MSA 0.1783 0.2951 0.1505 0.1904 0.327 0.1713 
Ann Arbor, MI PMSA 0.3357 0.4719 0.3374 0.334 0.473 0.3217 
Detroit, MI PMSA 0.2595 0.3845 0.1377 0.2838 0.4121 0.154 
Flint, MI PMSA 0.3947 0.5184 0.2774 0.4145 0.5436 0.2785 
Dothan, AL MSA 0.3657 0.5032 0.3404 0.4028 0.5375 0.4145 
Dover, DE MSA 0.4231 0.5631 0.2783 0.4173 0.5424 0.3192 
Dubuque, IA MSA 0.2456 0.3262 0.2508 0.2468 0.3407 0.2652 
Eau Claire, WI MSA 0.3276 0.4202 0.3428 0.3272 0.4269 0.317 
El Paso, TX MSA 0.1735 0.2634 0.1085 0.1956 0.3199 0.1306 
Elkhart--Goshen, IN MSA 0.4169 0.5174 0.2389 0.4169 0.5202 0.2417 
Elmira, NY MSA 0.3008 0.4174 0.2845 0.3149 0.4284 0.2929 
Enid, OK MSA 0.2223 0.2537 0.2215 0.241 0.3597 0.2249 
Erie, PA MSA 0.2555 0.3576 0.2485 0.2608 0.363 0.2582 
Eugene--Springfield, OR MSA 0.141 0.2615 0.1462 0.1318 0.2489 0.1452 
Fayetteville, NC MSA 0.3214 0.4477 0.1452 0.3402 0.4733 0.1687 
Fayetteville--Springdale--Rog 0.3733 0.5092 0.3503 0.3606 0.4928 0.3117 
Flagstaff, AZ--UT MSA 0.2265 0.3108 0.2858 0.1918 0.32 0.2795 
Florence, AL MSA 0.3829 0.5287 0.3153 0.3899 0.5337 0.4007 
Florence, SC MSA 0.4461 0.5597 0.3649 0.4464 0.5532 0.357 
Fort Collins--Loveland, CO MS 0.095 0.2101 0.0932 0.1153 0.2284 0.1189 
Fort Myers--Cape Coral, FL MSA 0.289 0.434 0.2247 0.3442 0.4951 0.2438 
Fort Pierce--Port St. Lucie, 0.2039 0.3326 0.1139 0.2272 0.3399 0.1594 
Fort Walton Beach, FL MSA 0.1762 0.2463 0.1422 0.1828 0.2576 0.1314 
Fort Wayne, IN MSA 0.3027 0.4124 0.2705 0.3061 0.4112 0.2586 
Fresno, CA MSA 0.1086 0.2369 0.1373 0.1092 0.2391 0.1553 
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Gadsden, AL MSA 0.443 0.5609 0.3094 0.4843 0.5993 0.3526 
Gainesville, FL MSA 0.2967 0.3798 0.2294 0.2779 0.3722 0.2254 
Glens Falls, NY MSA 0.3991 0.5681 0.4134 0.4211 0.5773 0.4227 
Goldsboro, NC MSA 0.5041 0.615 0.5316 0.5417 0.671 0.4439 
Grand Junction, CO MSA 0.1064 0.1874 0.1451 0.1117 0.1515 0.1069 
Grand Rapids--Muskegon--Holla 0.3267 0.4507 0.2834 0.3381 0.4593 0.2835 
Great Falls, MT MSA 0.14 0.1701 0.1404 0.1371 0.2031 0.1741 
Green Bay, WI MSA 0.2566 0.3636 0.1741 0.2822 0.3895 0.201 
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--Hi 0.3858 0.5248 0.3123 0.4022 0.5364 0.3163 
Greenville, NC MSA 0.395 0.5036 0.2854 0.3723 0.4911 0.3023 
Greenville--Spartanburg--Ande 0.4074 0.5489 0.3051 0.4367 0.5731 0.3315 
Harrisburg--Lebanon--Carlisle 0.329 0.4699 0.3217 0.3239 0.4583 0.3168 
Hattiesburg, MS MSA 0.3307 0.4698 0.2877 0.3448 0.4931 0.3695 
Hickory--Morganton--Lenoir, N 0.4721 0.6036 0.3089 0.4619 0.5999 0.2713 
Honolulu, HI MSA 0.2918 0.4244 0.2197 0.2579 0.4191 0.2039 
Houma, LA MSA 0.3117 0.4549 0.3282 0.308 0.4278 0.2721 
Brazoria, TX PMSA 0.3446 0.52 0.2146 0.3494 0.5043 0.2633 
Galveston--Texas City, TX P 0.3314 0.4986 0.2632 0.3452 0.4802 0.2177 
Houston, TX PMSA 0.2005 0.3117 0.1221 0.2102 0.3359 0.1403 
Huntsville, AL MSA 0.3485 0.4595 0.3422 0.3722 0.4973 0.3399 
Indianapolis, IN MSA 0.2578 0.3746 0.2212 0.2734 0.4005 0.2071 
Iowa City, IA MSA 0.2574 0.3327 0.2541 0.3039 0.3852 0.3067 
Jackson, MI MSA 0.4244 0.527 0.3048 0.4362 0.5503 0.3257 
Jackson, MS MSA 0.2409 0.3594 0.2124 0.2537 0.3718 0.1966 
Jackson, TN MSA 0.3382 0.4418 0.3545 0.332 0.4246 0.3101 
Jacksonville, FL MSA 0.2332 0.3417 0.1616 0.2502 0.3657 0.1895 
Jacksonville, NC MSA 0.3585 0.4225 0.282 0.3261 0.4443 0.2445 
Jamestown, NY MSA 0.3947 0.5063 0.4138 0.4051 0.5217 0.4292 
Janesville--Beloit, WI MSA 0.3142 0.4667 0.3962 0.3107 0.4625 0.3589 
Johnstown, PA MSA 0.4117 0.565 0.4148 0.4315 0.5821 0.4158 
Jonesboro, AR MSA 0.3713 0.4846 0.2583 0.3681 0.4686 0.2417 
Joplin, MO MSA 0.3357 0.4489 0.3128 0.3441 0.458 0.3218 
Kalamazoo--Battle Creek, MI M 0.3452 0.4818 0.2973 0.357 0.4909 0.3154 
Killeen--Temple, TX MSA 0.2571 0.421 0.2277 0.2595 0.4107 0.2015 
Knoxville, TN MSA 0.346 0.5009 0.2947 0.3692 0.5253 0.2858 
Kokomo, IN MSA 0.3377 0.4549 0.3342 0.3443 0.4682 0.3478 
Lafayette, LA MSA 0.2796 0.4378 0.2562 0.2769 0.4309 0.2478 
Lafayette, IN MSA 0.2452 0.3294 0.251 0.2416 0.3351 0.2567 
Lake Charles, LA MSA 0.2336 0.3488 0.2074 0.2663 0.404 0.2293 
Lakeland--Winter Haven, FL MS 0.3048 0.424 0.2324 0.2849 0.4106 0.2015 
Lancaster, PA MSA 0.4535 0.574 0.3929 0.4608 0.5819 0.3757 
Lansing--East Lansing, MI MSA 0.2907 0.3812 0.265 0.3093 0.4011 0.2756 
Laredo, TX MSA 0.058 0.0913 0.0785 0.135 0.1521 0.1299 
Las Cruces, NM MSA 0.2448 0.398 0.3086 0.1641 0.3066 0.1726 
Lawrence, KS MSA 0.2305 0.3064 0.1686 0.2257 0.3041 0.22 
Lawton, OK MSA 0.2322 0.3585 0.2686 0.2561 0.3761 0.3016 
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Lexington, KY MSA 0.2401 0.3465 0.2318 0.2432 0.3526 0.201 
Lima, OH MSA 0.353 0.4804 0.3199 0.3787 0.5007 0.3092 
Lincoln, NE MSA 0.1349 0.1957 0.1106 0.1375 0.1991 0.1104 
Little Rock--North Little Roc 0.2452 0.3959 0.2143 0.2609 0.4114 0.2305 
Longview--Marshall, TX MSA 0.3623 0.4867 0.3037 0.3876 0.5155 0.3299 
Los Angeles--Long Beach, CA 0.1935 0.3145 0.0741 0.1858 0.3092 0.0672 
Orange County, CA PMSA 0.3788 0.5148 0.1425 0.3902 0.5311 0.1534 
Riverside--San Bernardino, 0.0648 0.1646 0.0566 0.0597 0.156 0.0726 
Ventura, CA PMSA 0.1292 0.2695 0.1092 0.1238 0.2658 0.1264 
Lubbock, TX MSA 0.1438 0.2242 0.1206 0.1602 0.2522 0.1524 
Lynchburg, VA MSA 0.3761 0.5097 0.3925 0.3911 0.5328 0.3849 
Macon, GA MSA 0.2592 0.4195 0.2466 0.2736 0.4314 0.208 
Madison, WI MSA 0.2348 0.3591 0.231 0.2469 0.3678 0.2066 
Mansfield, OH MSA 0.3484 0.4761 0.254 0.3542 0.4869 0.2639 
McAllen--Edinburg--Mission, T 0.2416 0.4067 0.1893 0.2561 0.407 0.1144 
Medford--Ashland, OR MSA 0.1596 0.2853 0.1993 0.1506 0.2716 0.1854 
Melbourne--Titusville--Palm B 0.2039 0.3413 0.0938 0.2397 0.3544 0.1157 
Merced, CA MSA 0.2172 0.3705 0.2042 0.1663 0.3087 0.1806 
Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA 0.1999 0.3109 0.0336 0.2229 0.3136 0.0403 
Miami, FL PMSA 0.128 0.2194 0.0479 0.1326 0.2293 0.0436 
Milwaukee--Waukesha, WI PMS 0.2686 0.4072 0.2037 0.3032 0.4422 0.2199 
Racine, WI PMSA 0.323 0.4252 0.2368 0.348 0.4543 0.2633 
Missoula, MT MSA 0.1943 0.2637 0.2255 0.2252 0.3293 0.2575 
Mobile, AL MSA 0.236 0.3862 0.2476 0.2824 0.4422 0.2577 
Modesto, CA MSA 0.13 0.2315 0.1458 0.1199 0.2188 0.1247 
Monroe, LA MSA 0.3331 0.4389 0.316 0.3656 0.4797 0.3571 
Montgomery, AL MSA 0.2239 0.342 0.2402 0.2434 0.3783 0.2776 
Muncie, IN MSA 0.3558 0.4589 0.3312 0.3677 0.4694 0.2952 
Myrtle Beach, SC MSA 0.3737 0.4919 0.2928 0.3877 0.5016 0.3113 
Naples, FL MSA 0.119 0.2122 0.0921 0.1208 0.2154 0.0712 
Nashville, TN MSA 0.3032 0.432 0.2444 0.3226 0.449 0.2443 
New Orleans, LA MSA 0.1194 0.2359 0.1242 0.1238 0.2421 0.1196 
Bergen--Passaic, NJ PMSA 0.4199 0.5659 0.254 0.4164 0.5675 0.2661 
Dutchess County, NY PMSA 0.405 0.5425 0.2924 0.4278 0.5645 0.3134 
Jersey City, NJ PMSA 0.3703 0.496 0.1663 0.3776 0.503 0.1622 
Middlesex--Somerset--Hunter 0.3464 0.469 0.2237 0.361 0.4924 0.2408 
Monmouth--Ocean, NJ PMSA 0.379 0.5152 0.2126 0.3882 0.5281 0.2105 
Nassau--Suffolk, NY PMSA 0.4166 0.5503 0.2055 0.4228 0.5557 0.2131 
New York, NY PMSA 0.2109 0.3332 0.1181 0.1845 0.3305 0.1192 
Newark, NJ PMSA 0.2445 0.3895 0.1914 0.2529 0.3955 0.1816 
Trenton, NJ PMSA 0.3751 0.5092 0.2343 0.4186 0.5501 0.2608 
Ocala, FL MSA 0.3893 0.5428 0.3116 0.4152 0.56 0.2668 
Odessa--Midland, TX MSA 0.1252 0.1937 0.1118 0.1275 0.2206 0.1394 
Oklahoma City, OK MSA 0.1759 0.2948 0.1718 0.1872 0.3096 0.189 
Orlando, FL MSA 0.1933 0.3244 0.1363 0.2079 0.3443 0.1611 
Owensboro, KY MSA 0.3489 0.4258 0.3012 0.3701 0.4395 0.2972 
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Panama City, FL MSA 0.2156 0.2902 0.1342 0.2541 0.3068 0.1507 
Pensacola, FL MSA 0.2019 0.3343 0.1386 0.2271 0.3499 0.1695 
Peoria--Pekin, IL MSA 0.2593 0.3751 0.2344 0.2747 0.3927 0.248 
Atlantic--Cape May, NJ PMSA 0.3404 0.4894 0.3103 0.3563 0.5048 0.3236 
Vineland--Millville--Bridge 0.3618 0.4924 0.3192 0.352 0.4919 0.3184 
Wilmington--Newark, DE--MD 0.2906 0.428 0.2078 0.3251 0.4598 0.2141 
Phoenix--Mesa, AZ MSA 0.0597 0.1387 0.0611 0.0664 0.1543 0.071 
Pine Bluff, AR MSA 0.2176 0.381 0.227 0.2277 0.3939 0.1845 
Pittsburgh, PA MSA 0.286 0.4264 0.2447 0.2978 0.4367 0.2528 
Pocatello, ID MSA 0.1338 0.1939 0.1408 0.1407 0.1945 0.1429 
Salem, OR PMSA 0.2203 0.3996 0.2209 0.1849 0.3541 0.1832 
Provo--Orem, UT MSA 0.0671 0.1555 0.0841 0.077 0.1796 0.0704 
Pueblo, CO MSA 0.0536 0.1328 0.0559 0.0854 0.1516 0.0927 
Punta Gorda, FL MSA 0.2067 0.3026 0.1167 0.2193 0.3375 0.1484 
Raleigh--Durham--Chapel Hill, 0.3332 0.4743 0.2871 0.3499 0.4964 0.2738 
Rapid City, SD MSA 0.1295 0.157 0.1056 0.2521 0.2026 0.0965 
Reading, PA MSA 0.3827 0.5156 0.38 0.3875 0.5253 0.38 
Redding, CA MSA 0.186 0.2433 0.1584 0.1658 0.2324 0.1482 
Reno, NV MSA 0.0498 0.1011 0.0385 0.0467 0.1118 0.0345 
Richland--Kennewick--Pasco, W 0.097 0.2205 0.102 0.1054 0.224 0.101 
Richmond--Petersburg, VA MSA 0.2256 0.3366 0.177 0.243 0.3535 0.1687 
Roanoke, VA MSA 0.2077 0.3337 0.2238 0.2236 0.352 0.2172 
Rochester, MN MSA 0.2671 0.381 0.1387 0.2256 0.3191 0.1901 
Rochester, NY MSA 0.2865 0.3972 0.2822 0.2918 0.4053 0.2858 
Rockford, IL MSA 0.2503 0.3641 0.2382 0.2604 0.3774 0.2488 
Rocky Mount, NC MSA 0.4073 0.5231 0.3273 0.432 0.5574 0.3849 
Sacramento, CA PMSA 0.1238 0.2451 0.1256 0.126 0.2417 0.1136 
Yolo, CA PMSA 0.1475 0.2247 0.1565 0.1468 0.2238 0.1544 
Saginaw--Bay City--Midland, M 0.352 0.4724 0.3654 0.3605 0.4915 0.3923 
St. Cloud, MN MSA 0.3607 0.5015 0.3338 0.3771 0.5075 0.3655 
St. Joseph, MO MSA 0.1925 0.3023 0.1899 0.2131 0.3156 0.2077 
Salinas, CA MSA 0.1172 0.2604 0.1547 0.1009 0.2402 0.1346 
Salt Lake City--Ogden, UT MSA 0.2067 0.3275 0.1428 0.2865 0.3211 0.1187 
San Angelo, TX MSA 0.1599 0.1823 0.1299 0.225 0.1812 0.1041 
San Antonio, TX MSA 0.1612 0.2495 0.1158 0.1863 0.2898 0.1476 
San Diego, CA MSA 0.1332 0.238 0.0942 0.1207 0.2337 0.0935 
Oakland, CA PMSA 0.2331 0.3687 0.1248 0.2472 0.3893 0.1386 
San Francisco, CA PMSA 0.1448 0.2752 0.0898 0.1369 0.2725 0.0933 
San Jose, CA PMSA 0.1572 0.2681 0.0753 0.1541 0.2603 0.0733 
Santa Cruz--Watsonville, CA 0.2667 0.4233 0.2925 0.2451 0.3867 0.2362 
Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 0.2547 0.4106 0.2143 0.2155 0.3725 0.2043 
Vallejo--Fairfield--Napa, C 0.1382 0.253 0.1365 0.1416 0.2512 0.1389 
San Luis Obispo--Atascadero-- 0.1467 0.2452 0.1631 0.1574 0.2575 0.1464 
Santa Barbara--Santa Maria--L 0.0766 0.1941 0.1276 0.0744 0.1795 0.1115 
Santa Fe, NM MSA 0.2382 0.3487 0.2441 0.2472 0.3785 0.2493 
Sarasota--Bradenton, FL MSA 0.171 0.2759 0.0727 0.1912 0.3054 0.0877 
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Savannah, GA MSA 0.239 0.3837 0.2175 0.2737 0.493 0.2673 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazle 0.2836 0.4136 0.2859 0.2953 0.4259 0.2844 
Bremerton, WA PMSA 0.4023 0.5503 0.3745 0.4358 0.5791 0.3589 
Olympia, WA PMSA 0.3557 0.4581 0.3029 0.3365 0.4559 0.2506 
Seattle--Bellevue--Everett, 0.1379 0.261 0.1089 0.1459 0.2714 0.1081 
Tacoma, WA PMSA 0.1651 0.3157 0.1225 0.1713 0.3108 0.1192 
Sharon, PA MSA 0.439 0.5616 0.4229 0.4469 0.5715 0.4357 
Sheboygan, WI MSA 0.3512 0.4927 0.2937 0.3508 0.4997 0.2704 
Sherman--Denison, TX MSA 0.4345 0.5116 0.4088 0.4654 0.5579 0.455 
Shreveport--Bossier City, LA 0.252 0.3868 0.288 0.2485 0.3805 0.2491 
Sioux Falls, SD MSA 0.2228 0.3171 0.2818 0.2184 0.3272 0.2835 
South Bend, IN MSA 0.2707 0.4061 0.2284 0.2832 0.4141 0.1786 
Spokane, WA MSA 0.1435 0.2531 0.132 0.1592 0.2828 0.1311 
Springfield, IL MSA 0.2502 0.3882 0.2758 0.261 0.4033 0.2577 
Springfield, MO MSA 0.2845 0.4106 0.2496 0.2955 0.4078 0.2908 
State College, PA MSA 0.3109 0.4397 0.3118 0.3036 0.4415 0.3141 
Stockton--Lodi, CA MSA 0.1494 0.2494 0.1649 0.1496 0.2496 0.1509 
Sumter, SC MSA 0.3333 0.4864 0.3046 0.3985 0.5289 0.4017 
Syracuse, NY MSA 0.2848 0.4056 0.3023 0.3013 0.4235 0.3181 
Tallahassee, FL MSA 0.3013 0.4091 0.3094 0.3178 0.4229 0.289 
Tampa--St. Petersburg--Clearw 0.2885 0.41 0.1764 0.3038 0.4365 0.1758 
Terre Haute, IN MSA 0.3345 0.4806 0.361 0.3364 0.4696 0.3297 
Toledo, OH MSA 0.217 0.3382 0.1795 0.2299 0.3512 0.185 
Topeka, KS MSA 0.2284 0.3746 0.1902 0.2671 0.4023 0.2083 
Tucson, AZ MSA 0.0654 0.1524 0.0966 0.0563 0.1499 0.0784 
Tulsa, OK MSA 0.1773 0.3171 0.2175 0.1745 0.3181 0.1968 
Tuscaloosa, AL MSA 0.2684 0.3589 0.2396 0.2522 0.3902 0.2529 
Tyler, TX MSA 0.3874 0.5223 0.3519 0.3992 0.529 0.3752 
Utica--Rome, NY MSA 0.2375 0.4074 0.2899 0.2599 0.4326 0.3001 
Victoria, TX MSA 0.2407 0.3441 0.3116 0.2638 0.3809 0.3483 
Visalia--Tulare--Porterville, 0.131 0.2747 0.1348 0.1171 0.2632 0.1436 
Waco, TX MSA 0.2686 0.3652 0.2664 0.2945 0.3904 0.2916 
Baltimore, MD PMSA 0.2647 0.4016 0.209 0.2801 0.4187 0.1995 
Hagerstown, MD PMSA 0.4176 0.5391 0.3835 0.4155 0.5405 0.381 
Waterloo--Cedar Falls, IA MSA 0.2268 0.336 0.2291 0.2255 0.3483 0.2414 
Wausau, WI MSA 0.3907 0.5075 0.3835 0.3922 0.5099 0.3499 
West Palm Beach--Boca Raton, 0.1386 0.2581 0.085 0.1596 0.268 0.085 
Wichita, KS MSA 0.1646 0.2711 0.1718 0.1696 0.2816 0.1801 
Wichita Falls, TX MSA 0.14 0.2277 0.0849 0.1404 0.2222 0.1015 
Williamsport, PA MSA 0.2448 0.4116 0.2915 0.2513 0.4208 0.3011 
Wilmington, NC MSA 0.2997 0.4545 0.273 0.3124 0.4594 0.2913 
Yakima, WA MSA 0.1585 0.2741 0.0987 0.1389 0.2723 0.1175 
York, PA MSA 0.4601 0.5939 0.3794 0.462 0.5829 0.3608 
Youngstown--Warren, OH MSA 0.3432 0.4567 0.2768 0.3598 0.4759 0.3016 
Yuba City, CA MSA 0.233 0.3342 0.2151 0.2206 0.3298 0.2104 
Yuma, AZ MSA 0.0382 0.1325 0.0584 0.0353 0.1178 0.0438 
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Table 1-4:Correlation Coefficients of the three sprawl measures 
 GINI ID SI 
GINI 1.000   
ID 0.969 1.000  











































































































Yuma, AZ MSA 0.038 0.035 0.133 0.118 0.058 0.044 
Casper, WY MSA 0.042 0.116 0.123 0.113 0.077 0.102 
Reno, NV MSA 0.049 0.047 0.101 0.112 0.039 0.035 
Pueblo, CO MSA 0.053 0.085 0.133 0.152 0.056 0.093 
Laredo, TX MSA 0.058 0.135 0.091 0.152 0.079 0.129 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA 0.059 0.066 0.139 0.154 0.061 0.071 
Riverside-San Bernadino, 
CA MSA 
0.065 0.059 0.165 0.156 0.057 0.073 
Tucson, AZ MSA 0.065 0.056 0.152 0.150 0.097 0.078 
Provo-Orem, UT MSA 0.067 0.077 0.156 0.179 0.084 0.070 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-
Lompoc, CA MSA 
0.077 0.074 0.194 0.179 0.128 0.112 
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Goldsboro, NC MSA 0.504 0.542 0.615 0.671 0.532 0.444 
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, 
NC MSA 
0.472 0.462 0.604 0.600 0.309 0.271 
York, PA MSA 0.460 0.462 0.594 0.583 0.379 0.361 
Lancaster, PA MSA 0.453 0.461 0.574 0.582 0.393 0.376 
Florence, SC MSA 0.446 0.446 0.559 0.553 0.365 0.357 
Gadsden, AL MSA 0.443 0.484 0.561 0.599 0.309 0.353 
Sharon, PA MSA 0.439 0.447 0.562 0.572 0.423 0.436 
Anniston, AL MSA 0.439 0.439 0.527 0.539 0.331 0.343 
Sherman-Denison, TX MSA 0.435 0.465 0.512 0.558 0.409 0.455 
Jackson, MI MSA 0.424 0.436 0.527 0.550 0.305 0.326 
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Gini Coefficient (G) 
Index of Disimilarity 
(ID) 
Sprawl Index (SI) 
n/a U.S. Census Gazetteer Files-
2000 
1990 Census of Population and 




property tax rate 
+/- U.S. Census Summary File 3-
2000, 1990 
The amount of property tax 
paid by the homeowner, 
divided by the reported value 
of their home, in the year prior 





U.S. Census Summary File 1-
2000, 1990 
Total population in the MSA, 
measured in 1000s, square 




- U.S. Census of Agriculture, 
1997, 1987 
Value of agricultural land per 




+ U.S. Census Summary File 3-
2000, 1990 
The number of non-white 
people  in the central city, 





+/- U.S. Census of Governments, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
1997, 1987 
Total Tax Revenue divided by 
Total Personal Income in the 
State 
Average home price 
in the MSA 
- U.S. Census Summary File 3-
2000, 1990 
Total value of homes in the 
MSA (as reported by 
homeowners), divided by the 
total number of homes 
MSA personal 
income 
+ Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
1997, 1987 
Total personal income in the 
MSA, measured in $1000s 
Share of the 
population in public 
school 
+ U.S. Census Summary File 1-
2000, 1990 
Share of the population under 
age 18 attending public school 
Percent change in 
population, 10 year 
+/- Calculated from U.S. Census 
Summary File 1-2000, 1990 
10 year population change in 
the MSA 
Total number of 
municipalities in the 
MSA 
+ U.S. Census of Governments, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
1997, 1987 
Total number of municipalities 
in the MSA 
Standard Deviation 
of property tax rate 
+ See Gini, ID, Sprawl Index MSA specific standard 





                                                 
27 The amount of property tax paid in 1989 was combined with several other fees and payments, making the 
isolation of the property tax paid impossible. In order to have an estimate of property taxes paid in 1989 to 
calculate an effective tax rate, I derived the amount of property taxes paid as a share of total property tax revenue, 
using the values from Census 2000 and the Census of Governments data for 1987 and 1997.  
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Table 1-8: Instrumental Variables Description and Source Notes 
Variable Expected Effect on 
Property Tax Rate 
Source Definition 
Central City poverty rate +/- U.S. Census Summary 
File 3-2000, 1990 
The number of people 
considered in poverty in 
the central city, divided 
by the total central city 
population 
State share of state and 
local tax revenue 
 
- U.S. Census of 
Governments, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 1997, 
1987 
State portion of state and 
local tax revenue 
MSA intergovernmental 
revenue from the state 
- U.S. Census of 
Governments, Bureau of 




revenue transferred from 
the state to the MSA 
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Table 1-9: Summary Statistics 
  1990 2000 
Variable Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Gini Coefficient 0.259   0.100    0.038   0.504 0.270    0.102    0.0352   0 .541 
Index of Dissimilarity 0.376 0.115 0.913 0.615 0.388 0.117 0.112 0.671 
Sprawl Index 0.225 0.093 0.033 0.532 0.227 0.093 0.035 0.455 
MSA population (1000s) 612 1,048 57 8,863 700 1,174 58 9,519 
MSA area (1000s square 
miles) 
2.262 3.288 0.047 39.369 2.262 3.288 0.047 39.369 
Central City non-white 
population share  
0.25 0.17 0.02 0.93 0.311 0.186 0.035 0.993 
Average home price in the 
MSA ($1000s) 
91.47   53.75 31.82 353.44 138.067    64.463 66.759 547.206 
State share of state and local 
tax revenue 
0.608 0.067 0.491 0.803 0.635 0.058 0.536 0.821 
MSA Effective property tax 
rate 
0.095 0.062 0.007 0.314 0.112     0.051 0.025 0.264 
MSA agricultural land 
value/acre ($1000s) 
5.25 14.18 0 169.10 8.12 21.735 0 320.082 
MSA personal income 
($1000s) 
10,127 19,769 792 176,272 17,938 33,609 1,247 299,412 
Municipalities 93.49   125.78 4 1278 99.95 133.36 1 1456 
Share of population in public 
school 
0.646   0.076 0.177 0.947 0.707     
 
0.043 0.256 0.810 
Standard deviation of 
property tax rate 
0.080 0.0155 0 0.139 0.069 0.0102 0 0.0653 
Property taxes as share of 
total tax revenue 
0.756 0.162 0.242 0.994 0.739 0.159 0.253 0.989 
Sales taxes as share of total 
tax revenue 
0.174 0.149 0 0.608 0.186 0.155 0 0.642 
State-level Tax Burden 0.060 
 
0.011 0.045 0.102 0.0644             0.011 0.047 0.0999 
Central City poverty rate 0.183 0.068 0 0.580 0.177 0.057 0.059 0.469 
State share of state and local 
tax revenue 
0.608 0.067 0.491 0.803 0.635 0.058 0.536 0.821 
MSA intergovernmental 
revenue from the state 
0.337 0.872 0.016 9.534 0.634 1.559 0.041 17.03 
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MSA Effective property tax rate - -0.188** 
(0.078) 






















































Central City poverty rate 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
- 






MSA-level of intergovernmental 








   
R-squared within 0.458 0.282 
N=269 
Regression includes year fixed effects 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 1-11: Elasticities-Dependent variable-sprawl Gini 
 
 Fixed Effects 






MSA agricultural land value/acre ($1000s) 
 
-0.002 
Central City non-white population share 
 
-0.022 
State-level Tax Burden 
 
-0.252 
Average home price in the MSA 
 
-0.063 
MSA personal income 
 
-0.002 
Share of the population in public school 
 
-0.060 
Percent change in population, 10 year 
 
-0.012 
Total number of municipalities in the MSA 
 
0.066 


























































































Average home price 



















Share of the 










Percent change in 











Total number of 





































State share of state 























     
Adjusted R-squared  0.478 0.411 0.601 0.489 
N=269 
Regressions include dummies indicating Census region 
Standard errors in parentheses 










































 1990-elasticity 2000-elasticity 














State-level Tax Burden 
 
0.349 0.055 
Average home price in the MSA 
 
-0.075 -0.148 
MSA personal income 
 
0.025 0.103 

































 First Stage 
Population less 
than 500,000 

























































































































MSA-level of intergovernmental 






     
Within R-squared  0.496 0.304 0.934 0.826 
N= 198  110  
Regressions include year fixed effects 
Standard errors in parentheses 
















 First Stage 
Index of 
Dissimilarity 





















MSA agricultural land value/acre 
($1000s) 


















State-level Tax Burden 
 
































































Central City poverty rate 0.003  ***  
(0.001) 
-- 0 .003***  
(0.001) 
-- 
State share of state and local tax 
revenue 





MSA-level of intergovernmental 
revenue from the state 
0.0001*** 
(0.0006)    
-- -0.0001***   
(0.0006) 
-- 
     
Within R-squared  0.458 0.265 0.459 0.051 
N=269 
Regressions include year fixed effects 
Standard errors in parentheses 









































 First Stage 
Sprawl Gini-
property share 











-- -0.207**   
(0.088) 
-- -- 
MSA Sales Tax 
Share 
-- -- -- 0.297** 
(0.139) 




0.0005   
(0.00005) 





-0.0002    
(0.0003)   




















0.194   
(0.489) 







price in the MSA 











(0.0007)   
0.0006 
(0.0003)   
0.0007 
(0.0004)   
0.0008 
(0.0003)   
Share of the 
population in 
public school 
0.043     
(0.049) 











0.001   
(0.015) 
-0.061   
(0.038) 
0.010   
(0.018) 


























-- -0.002  
(0.001) 
-- 
State share of 
state and local tax 
revenue 







revenue from the 
state 
-0.00007   




     
Within R-squared  0.174 0.093 0.109 0.039 
N=269 
Regressions include year fixed effects 
Standard errors in parentheses 











New England Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New 




New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania  
East North Central Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, 
Wisconsin 
 
West North Central Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota 
 
South Atlantic Delaware, D.C., Florida, Georgia, 
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Virginia, West Virginia 
 
East South Central Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, 
Tennessee 
 
West South Central Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas 
 
Mountain Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming 
 

































As early as the 1930’s, the patterns of development that described the location 
decisions of people began to take on a negative connotation, and the development of 
suburbs and the exodus of people from the central cities to these outlying areas was 
described with a new term: sprawl. Earle Draper, the Director of Planning at the 
Tennessee Valley Authority said in 1937, “Perhaps diffusion is too kind of a word. ... In 
bursting its bounds, the city actually sprawled and made the countryside 
ugly...uneconomic [in terms] of services and doubtful social value.”  While it may be true 
that sprawling development is indeed ugly, with questionable social value, the work in 
this chapter focuses on a different outcome of sprawl.  
There are a number of consequences commonly linked to urban sprawl, and the 
list continually grows. Some of the most commonly noted outcomes of sprawl are 
negative, and although there are positive outcomes associated with sprawl, those are not 
discussed in this chapter.29 Such social ills as poor physical health (Sturm and Cohen, 
2003); obesity (Plantinga and Bernell, 2007); environmental consequences (Kahn, 2000); 
and the decrease in a sense of community (Brueckner and Largey, 2006) have all been 
evaluated as possible consequences of sprawl.  
Among various negative outcomes of sprawl are purported effects on local public 
services. The common perception is that expenditures on a number of different public 
services including waste management, sewer, roads and utilities are expected to increase 
in the presence of higher levels of sprawl, although is no clear theoretical reasoning for 
                                                 
29 For examples of some of the benefits of sprawl, see Gordon and Richardson (1998), Glaeser and Kahn 
(2003), and Burchell et al. (2005). 
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this and little empirical support.  The response of local governments and planners to the 
notion that higher degrees of sprawl results in higher expenditures is to encourage 
smaller, more dense development to decrease public service expenditures. Despite these 
claims, it is not clear that more densely developed areas are necessarily more cost-
efficient in terms of public services.  
Sprawl is neither a density nor a population measure, and the possible effects it 
may have are ambiguous. There are two possible (and opposing) ways that sprawl might 
influence local public service expenditures. First, sprawl’s possible influence on local 
public services will depend on the service in question. There is no reason to believe that 
all local public services are impacted similarly and can be lumped together because each 
service may experience its own unique production, cost, and demand functions. When 
discussing possible influences on public services, it is best to discuss the different 
impacts sprawl might have on different types of local public services. For public services 
where we believe that economies of density30 might come in to play, we might expect 
areas with lower levels of sprawl (indicating higher concentrations of people) to 
experience decreasing per capita expenditure costs.  
Although density and the distribution of people are not identical, it is likely that 
for some public services, where there are greater concentration of residents, we will see 
lower per capita expenditures. Examples of public services where this hypothesis might 
prevail include sewer, utilities, and highways. It may be more cost-effective to provide 
                                                 
30 Economies of density occur where there are cost savings due to higher average density levels; this is the 
basis for encouraging more densely populated developments. It is also possible, however that diseconomies 
of density exist, and that public service expenditures rise with higher density levels. Because the presence 
of economies/diseconomies of density will depend on the type of public service in question, it is necessary 
to analyze different services separately.  
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these types of services to areas where the population is more highly concentrated, or in 
other words, where there is a tighter distribution of people. An area with a low sprawl 
value might see higher per capita expenditures in other categories of local public 
services: examples include police and possibly fire. In these two categories of services, 
areas with high concentrations of residents (and therefore lower sprawl values) may be 
subject to some of the social conditions often seen in areas with high densities, i.e. higher 
crime rates, higher poverty rates, etc. To achieve some given, desired level of safety, 
areas with low sprawl might require more in the way of police and fire expenditures vis-
à-vis areas with higher sprawl (or less concentration of people). The opposite effect is 
also possible, however, if we believe that areas with lower concentrations of residents are 
more geographically distant from areas of higher concentrations of residents, then we 
might expect to see higher per capita expenditures for higher levels of sprawl. It may cost 
more per resident to provide police services to an area that is further out, and where the 
population is more spread out.  
The literature in economics (as well as other fields) has not really examined the 
question of how sprawl impacts public service expenditures. To my knowledge, there has 
been no theoretical treatment of the possible relationship between sprawl and 
expenditures on local public services. Most previous studies have used some measure of 
average density as a proxy for sprawl. Although there have been case studies and 
simulations resulting in cost projections based on differing (often hypothesized) levels of 
sprawl, only a handful of studies have examined how actual sprawl levels (as proxied by 
average density) impact local public service expenditures.  
 
 80
In this chapter, I examine how sprawl influences different local public service 
expenditures, distinguishing between current operating and capital expenditures because 
sprawl may influence these two broad categories differently. Using the three unique 
measures of sprawl constructed and discussed in detail in the previous chapter (with the 
sprawl Gini being the main focus), I use publicly available data to empirically test 
whether sprawl has any influence on expenditures using a cross-sectional approach, in 
addition to a fixed effects panel model. In addition to sprawl, I also test how average 
density and population growth influence local public service expenditures.  
There are a number of issues requiring clarification and further discussion when 
addressing the potential impact of sprawl on public services. First, it is necessary to 
precisely define what is meant by public service expenditures. Because the concept can 
take on different meanings, and in fact does so within the literature, it is necessary to 
clarify the concept. It is also necessary to outline the conceptual model illustrating how 
sprawl (in addition to population growth and average density) may work to influence 
public service expenditures. Much of the literature does not explicitly define sprawl, but 
rather uses an average density measure, which proxies not only for sprawl but also for the 
“harshness” of the environment in which the public service is provided. I provide a 
discussion of how sprawl may influence different public services with clear links to the 
previous literature.   
Despite the potentially important consequences, there have been very few studies 
examining the impacts of sprawl on the costs of public services; even fewer have been 
undertaken with a broad-focus on a large number of areas (in contrast to case studies) 
using actual data (as opposed to simulations). An important motivation for this chapter is 
 
 81
that despite increasing interest, very little is known about how variables related to 
development patterns such as population, population change, density and sprawl 
influence public expenditures in the local sector.  
The work in this chapter contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. 
There is no reason to presume (as is the common belief) that sprawling development 
patterns result in costlier public services vis-à-vis less sprawled development. In this 
chapter, I focus on the empirical question of the relationship between sprawl and local 
public service expenditures, using three unique measures of sprawl, and incorporating 
two broad theories of explaining public service expenditures in a fixed effects panel 
framework. In addition to using average density and population measures, I gauge how 
sprawl influences a number of different public service expenditures, separated into both 
current operating and capital expenditures. Using data available from the Census of 
Governments, I am able to assess how sprawl actually impacted expenditures, as opposed 
to previous studies that hypothetically examine how expenditures might be affected.  
Because of the lack of research and the contradictory nature of previous empirical 
work, more research on how population growth, average density, and sprawl impact 
public service expenditure decisions is necessary.  The nature of this research is twofold: 
the first component will add to the current knowledge on local public service 
expenditures, in particular how sprawl, density, and changing population may influence 
these decisions. The second part of this research speaks to the relevant policy question, 
that is, does sprawl make any difference in local public expenditure decisions. Based on 
the unique measures of sprawl used in this analysis, I find that for many categories of 
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public expenditures, sprawl has no impact, while both population and average density 
have varying degrees of influence on different categories of expenditures.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.B describes the conceptual 
model and related literature. Section 2.C contains a brief description of the sprawl 
measures used in this study as well as descriptions of the data and empirical 
methodology. Results are presented in Section 2.D and Section 2.E concludes.  
2.B Conceptual Model and Relevant Literature 
 
 The conceptual framework described below is drawn from Ladd (1994), who 
examines the impact that population (as opposed to sprawl) may have on spending, so 
extension of her conceptual model to include sprawl is required. Because population 
growth does not necessarily mean sprawl, in this section I attempt to distinguish between 
the different ways that sprawl, density, and population may influence the expenditure on 
public services and tie that discussion to the relevant literature.  
 I first clarify the term costs, and it’s meaning in the context of this chapter. As in 
Bradford et. al (1969) and Ladd (1992), in discussing the output of the local public sector 
I distinguish between the final outputs of value to residents and the direct inputs required 
to produce a given level of output by the local public sector. For example, if fire 
protection is the local public service of interest most residents are likely concerned with 
the response time and proximity of fire departments rather than the number of firehouses 
or fire personnel employed.  
Ladd (1992) notes that the use of the term cost, particularly when discussing local 
public services can be confusing, due to the failure of many authors to distinguish 
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between the costs of direct outputs and the final outputs of value. The failure to make this 
distinction often results in opposing expectations when discussing the possible effects of 
density on public service costs.  On the one hand, in the presence of economies of 
density, higher average density results in lower production costs, while on the other hand, 
it is also possible that higher density may cause the cost of providing the final output to 
rise. Throughout this chapter, when referring to local public service costs, I refer to the 
cost of providing final outputs of value to residents. Available data, however, do not 
provide the cost of providing final outputs, so in this chapter, costs are proxied by the 
amount of the local expenditure for each service.  
Local Public Service Expenditures 
Local public services are provided to residents through local public expenditures. 
Per capita spending for a given level of local public expenditures (e) is described using 
the relationship below, where (S) is the service level for each resident, (C) is the unit cost 
of providing services to each resident, and (SD) represents the division of responsibility 
for these services between state and local governments.  
e=S*C*SD 
 There is an extensive literature explaining the public service expenditure 
decisions of local governments. These studies typically fall into two broad categories: 
estimating cost functions and estimating determinants of demand. Cost studies generally 
focus on scale economies, production technologies, and other related aspects,31 while 
demand studies assess the role of choice and a number of explanatory variables that are 
expected to influence residents’ demands for local public services.  
                                                 
31 See Hirsch (1970) for a general discussion of local public services and cost functions.  
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The research in this chapter builds on previous work examining the relationship 
between population, average density and public service costs.  Two separate studies by 
Ladd (1992; 1994) assess the relationship between a number of explanatory variables, 
and population-change and density variables.  Although she focuses on population rather 
than sprawl, Ladd (1992; 1994) are examples of one of the best attempts to gauge the 
impact of population growth on the cost of public services. Her conceptual examines the 
impact that population growth has on local per capita public spending and finds the net 
results ambiguous. Because of the ambiguity found in the conceptual model, she notes 
that empirical work is necessary to determine the direction and magnitude of the impacts 
of population growth.  
Focusing on measures of population, population growth, and average density, 
Ladd (1992) estimates the demand relationship for per capita current operating, public 
safety, and capital expenditures in a cross-section of counties. A number of explanatory 
variables are incorporated, representing different tastes and preferences that may 
influence demand. In addition to the usual income, population and tax price variables, she 
uses the educational attainment of the population, the poverty rate, per capita public 
school enrollments, manufacturing and non-manufacturing jobs, and the average wage. 
Additionally, she uses what she terms intergovernmental relations variables which 
represent the degree to which states divide responsibilities among state and local 
governments. She uses local share variables to control for the differences in responsibility 
among different areas. For each category of spending, the local share is the ratio of local 
government spending divided by state and local total spending. Other variables 
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incorporated to represent intergovernmental relations are the per capita amount of 
intergovernmental aid from federal and state government.  
Ladd finds that most public services exhibit a U-shaped cost curve, and that in 
general, higher average densities typically result in higher per capita expenditure costs; 
while many of the planning results find higher average densities associated with lower 
per capita costs. There are a number of possible reasons for the discrepancies between 
Ladd’s work and many of the planning studies.  First, the planning literature generally 
focuses on capital costs of development, while Ladd uses current costs, and current costs 
tend to be larger than capital costs. This fact, combined with the failure to make a 
distinction between what precisely is meant by public service costs may lead to the 
differing results. The differences in these results can be attributed to both the different 
definitions of costs used in the studies, and very different methodologies. 
  Ladd (1994) uses two separate regression models to examine the fiscal impacts of 
local population growth (measuring population change rather than a measure of sprawl).   
In the first, Ladd regresses the percent change in per capita spending in county i on the 
percent change in population in county i, and the percent change in population in county 
i, squared.  In the second specification, Ladd expands the model and explores three 
separate dependent variables (all are percent changes): spending on current operations 
plus assistance and subsidies (general and utilities), capital outlays (general and utilities), 
and interest payments (general purpose).  Explanatory fiscal variables used in the model 
include the change in ratio of local spending to state and local spending, by state in the 
following areas: public safety, social services (including welfare, wealth, and hospitals), 
housing and community development, and transportation.   
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Ladd (1994) again finds a U-shaped cost curve, and her results reinforce those in 
her 1992 paper, suggesting that larger populations are associated with higher per capita 
public service expenditures.  Using a different methodology, Ladd and Yinger (1991) 
find that the cost of services may rise with density, results which again contradict the 
commonly expected perception that lower density results in higher public expenditure 
costs.  Both of these studies however, appear to be studies of economies of size, rather 
than sprawl. Fox and Gurley (2006) discuss how often, when analyzing public service 
delivery, the measure of economies of size is more relevant than economies of scale.  
Economies of size are analyzed by noting changes in the jurisdiction size, which includes 
both population and geographic changes, and the proportionate increase in input 
requirements.     
Costs of public services 
Continuing with Ladd’s exposition of the costs of providing public services, the 
costs are expected to be a function of the direct outputs, population level, and the 
environment in which the services are provided. The equation below shows this 
relationship.  
Cs = f (Cq, N, X) 
where Cq is the cost of the input, N is the population, and X is a vector of variables 
describing the environment in which the public services are provided. 
  The different components that make up the cost of providing a public service are 
discussed briefly below. Cost per unit of input (Cq) can be impacted by numerous things, 
but perhaps one of the most important attributes to explain the differences in public 
service costs is the idea of economies vs. diseconomies of scale. Public services where 
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large fixed costs can be spread over larger numbers of people often result in economies of 
scale; examples of this type of public service would be highway systems and roads, and 
utility lines. Diseconomies of scale may be found in those public services where increases 
in population result in higher average costs; possible examples include fire and police 
protection, as well as education. With these types of services, there are no cost savings 
with increasing levels of population.    
 The influence of the population (N) of a local area on the costs of output depends 
on the degree of publicness (p) of the good. Many empirical studies estimate that p is 
typically very close to 1 for local government expenditures. The implications of this 
finding are that these goods are affected by congestion, in a similar manner to the way 
private goods are impacted.32 When a public service is congestible, then the cost of 
providing that service is likely to rise with increased congestion. To maintain some given 
level of service (or service quality), more inputs may be necessary, resulting in a higher 
level of expenditures. 
 Finally, the environment (X) in which local public services are provided will 
impact the cost of the outputs in the following way. As discussed previously, costs will 
increase when the inputs needed increase, and the increase in inputs is due to the 
harshness of the environment. A number of ways of measuring the harshness of the 
environment have been explored in the literature; examples include: population density, 
poverty, and per capita number of students.33 In the econometric model discussed in the 
                                                 
32 Oates (1988) contains an excellent discussion of the congestion effects associated with local public 
goods.  
33 See Bradbury et al. (1984), and Ladd and Yinger (1991) for more details on studies focusing on 
harshness of the environment.  
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next section, sprawl is added to a number of other measures to proxy for harshness of the 
environment.  
Service Levels 
  The next component in the conceptual model is that of service levels and how 
different service levels are achieved. Service levels are typically defined as those services 
that voters place value on, such as educational attainment for education or level of safety 
for police protection. If Q is the total amount of direct inputs, the equation below 
describes the production function for S.  
S=f(Q, N, X) 
where N represents the population, and X is a vector of explanatory variables indicative 
of the environment in which the services are provided.  
The environment of service provision is first discussed in Bradford et al. (1969) 
and proposes that harsher environments may require more inputs to produce a given level 
of public services. Differing input requirements in harsher environments to produce a 
given level of service is best explained using an example of the possibility of different 
requirements for public safety in low population vs. high population environments. A low 
population area may require fewer police officers to achieve a given level of public safety 
per person than a higher population area. Because the more highly populated area would 
require more police officers to achieve a certain level of safety per capita, the 
“environment” in which the public service is being delivered is considered more harsh.34 
                                                 
34 Sprawl could easily be considered as the environment in which public services are provided. Because the 
focus of this study, however, is on sprawl’s impacts, sprawl is evaluated separately from other factors that 
may be indicative of the harshness of the environment.  
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 Population may affect public service levels in a number of ways, but will depend 
on the level of publicness of the services (or goods) in question. The degree of publicness 
ranges in value from zero to one; a value of one indicates that the services are private, 
and a value of zero indicates that the services are purely public.35 If a good is purely 
public, then the benefit residents receive is not influenced by population levels. In the 
case of private goods, in order to maintain a constant level of the public service, the 
intermediate outputs would need to vary proportionally with changes in the population.  
Demand for Services 
 The next step in formulating the analysis of providing public services in local 
areas is to examine the demand for public services. The demand equation for locally 
provided services can be expressed as: 
SD = f( Y, L, T),  
where Y refers to income, L refers to local preferences, and T is representative of the tax 
price. The variables in the demand equation represent those characteristics of the 
deciding or median voter.  
The median voter hypothesis (MVH) is one of the most common models in the 
public finance literature for estimating the determinants of demands for the services 
offered by state and local governments. While the median voter model has some 
weaknesses, it remains the predominant framework in which to model demand for 
government services, and provides the foundation upon which my empirical model is 
built.  
                                                 
35  A purely public good or service here is one that is both non-rival and non-excludable. The non-rival 
condition means that consumption of the good (or service) by one individual does not diminish another’s 
consumption, and the non-excludability condition means that no one can be excluded from consuming the 
good. See Samuelson (1954) for further discussion of public and private goods.  
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  The foundation of the MVH is the assumption that each household faces a 
maximization problem to find its desired level of public services. Because available  
government data do not include information on service prices or output, but rather on 
expenditures, the dependent variable in the median voter model is per capita expenditures 
for each public service category of interest. The other explanatory variables in the model 
are income, property values and tax price, supply price of the service in question, and a 
vector of taste parameters. The MVH framework is built around that of the decisive, or 
median voter, and therefore, whenever possible, explanatory variables are chosen in order 
to be representative of the median voter. The choice of explanatory variables in the 
econometric model and their relationship to the MVH is discussed further in section 2.D.  
Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) are the 
seminal papers estimating the demand for local public goods. Estimating the demand 
function for a variety of output categories, Borcherding and Deacon (1972) utilize the 
median voter model framework. Using a cross-section, state-level model, demand 
functions for eight separate categories of public services in 1962 were estimated: local 
education, higher education, highways, health and hospitals, police, fire, sewers and 
sanitation, and parks and recreation. The explanatory variables used include population, 
tax price, income, a measure of divisibility of the service, land area, and a measure of 
urbanization.  
The price elasticity of demand is negative and significant as expected; as the price 
for a particular service increases, the demand will decrease. The price elasticity of 
income displays the expected positive sign, one would expect as the income of the 
average citizen increases, the greater they would demand in terms of public services. It is 
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possible that an increase in income may increase the demand for quality, rather than 
quantity of public services. However, given the availability of public expenditure data 
(and the general lack of data on public service quality), it is not possible to disentangle 
the quality versus quantity question. Borcherding and Deacon find that the population 
level has a negative influence on public service expenditures, while land area in general 
has a positive effect. The urbanization variable which simply measured the percent of the 
state’s residents living in urban areas is positive yet significant in two equations: police 
and fire protection. This result can be explained by considering the differences between 
areas that are highly urbanized and those with less urbanized, more rural populations.  
Generally, higher levels of urbanization are also associated with higher densities and also 
higher levels of crime; these characteristics might result in a need to spend more on 
certain public services, as Borcherding and Deacon find.   
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) estimate demand functions of individuals for 
sub-state level services in the median-voter framework. Using a cross-section of 
muncipalities for a single year, the demand for expenditures in three different categories 
(police, parks and recreation, and total municipal expenditures) are estimated. The 
explanatory variables in their analysis are: the population in a municipality, the tax price 
for the resident with median income, median income level in a municipality, percent 
population change, percent non-white, density, percent of the population over age 65. 
Following theoretical expectations, the price elasticity of demand is expected to be 
negative, while the income elasticity is expected to positive; both variables display the 
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expected signs and are significant. In their pooled analysis,36 population change had a 
negative and significant elasticity, possibly because there is a lag between population 
change and a corresponding change in public service expenditures. The population 
elasticity has a positive and significant effect in all expenditure categories, while density 
has a negative and significant impact, but only in the equation estimating general 
expenditures.  
It is necessary to point out that despite its popularity, the median voter model is 
also subject to much criticism, mainly due to its simplistic nature. Several recent papers 
have addressed the simplicity of the median voter model, and have evaluated what level 
of aggregation is most appropriate for analysis, its predictive power for specific public 
services as well as aggregate government activity.37 However, despite continued 
criticism, the median voter model remains one of the most frequently used models in 
public finance. 
Thus, local public expenditure decisions are explained by three equations: the cost 
function, the service demanded equation, and the division of spending responsibilities 
between state and local governments. I do not explicitly estimate a cost function, but 
variables that will proxy for costs are incorporated in the analysis. I now turn my 
attention to the way that population and average density might influence expenditure 
decisions and then expand the discussion to include sprawl. 
 
                                                 
36 In addition to the pooled analysis, Bergstrom and Goodman also estimated separate regressions for each 
of the states in their sample. However, the results are generally quite similar to the pooled results so the 
individual state results are not discussed here. 
37 See Turnbull and Djoundourian (1994), Gouveia and Masia (1998), Turnbull (1998), and Turnbull and 
Mitias (1999) for recent examples of studies based around the median voter model.  
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Population Growth, Density, Sprawl, and Local Public Service Expenditures 
 
 Given the conceptualization described above, I now broaden the framework 
described by Ladd (1994) to include a discussion of how sprawl, density, and population 
growth might influence per capita local expenditures. Recall that the general form of the 
cost function is: 
Cs = f (Cq, N, X). 
 While Ladd focuses primarily on density and population, the main focus of my 
research is the sprawl component. In order to appropriately attribute the impacts that 
sprawl might have, I must control for density, population level, and population growth. 
Table 2-1 shows the correlation coefficients between the sprawl Gini, population, 
population change, and average density. It is clear there is not strong collinearity between 
these measures, allowing them to be tested in an econometric specification. Referring 
back to the conceptual framework, the primary variables of interest here are N and X, 
because population, density and sprawl are proxies for the harshness of the environment 
in which the service is provided.  
Sprawl  
Although the impact of sprawl on the cost of providing public services appears to 
be a natural place for economics to contribute to this ongoing debate, the literature lacks 
studies addressing this issue. As previously mentioned, one of the most common 
arguments used as a basis for curbing sprawl is its high cost; the lower population 
densities associated with sprawl are generally expected to lead to higher expenditures on 
public services.  This idea of lower density development patterns leading to higher 
expenditures on public services is an oft-cited, yet unsubstantiated argument against 
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sprawl.  Low-density, spatially expansive development patterns are expected to lead to 
greater costs because of the potentially large investments required to extend roadways 
and other types of infrastructure that bring water, sewer, electricity, and other services 
long distances to reach fewer numbers of people.  It is further argued that urban sprawl 
may undermine economies of scale for other services, including police protection and 
public education, by lowering the density of individual consumers.   
Despite the common perception that sprawl increases public expenditures, there 
have been few discussions of the mechanism through which sprawl might influence local 
public expenditure decisions using a conceptual framework, rather than an ad hoc 
approach. The sprawl Gini measure I use, described in detail in the previous chapter, 
focuses on the distribution of people, and therefore is capturing different characteristics 
of an area than population and density. The distribution of people is a different 
characteristic than the average density of people; for example, an area with its population 
evenly spread out over the land, or an area with its population all living in the exact same 
spot would yield identical average density measurements. (Although this example is 
conceptually impossible, it is not possible for everyone in an MSA to live in the exact 
same spot, theoretically it is possible, and illustrates a weakness with using the average 
density measure.) It is possible, however, for two areas with vastly different populations 
and densities to have similar Gini values. Take for example Glen Falls, NY and Bergen-
Passaic, NJ, whose Gini values are 0.423 and 0.422, respectively. These are both 
relatively sprawled areas, yet if one looks at their population and density values, we see a 
much different picture. Glen Falls, NY has a population of 110,993 and an average 
density of 188 people per square mile, whereas Bergen-Passaic, NJ has 2.8 million people 
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and is one of the more densely inhabited MSAs at 2,297 people per square mile. Because 
both population levels and density can impact local public service expenditures, we must 
take those two attributes into account, especially in light of how vastly different these 
values can be, even with a similar Gini value. Separately accounting for density and 
population allows the isolation of the impact of a different attribute of an area; the 
distribution of population.  
There are two possible ways that sprawl might impact per capita local 
expenditures. First, it is possible that higher concentrations of people (i.e. lower levels of 
sprawl), might experience decreasing per capita expenditures, in a manner similar to the 
way areas might experience economies of density. If, however, we believe that areas with 
lower concentration of people results in higher per capita expenditures, then higher levels 
of sprawl would result in higher expenditures. Because the impacts of sprawl 
conceptually are ambiguous, and not likely to be the same across different types of local 
public services, empirical analysis is necessary to distinguish not only the different ways 
density, population, and sprawl, might impact local public service expenditures, but how 
these effects might differ across public service types.  
The one relevant study in the economics literature is Carruthers and Ulfarsson 
(2003), where they examine the relationship between alternative development patterns 
and expenditures on public services for 283 metropolitan counties, observed over the ten 
year period, 1982-1992. 
Carruthers and Ulfarsson use a number of variables to attempt to characterize the 
spatial structure of urban areas.  Their measure of sprawl is composed of multiple 
variables including: the average number of jobs and people per acre of urbanized land 
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essentially an average density measure); the spatial extent of urbanized land area in a 
county, given by the total number of developed acres; and property value, expressed as 
the total locally assessed property value per acre of urbanized land.  The authors argue 
that using jobs and people are a better way to calculate density because the amount of 
developed land depends both on residential land use and on nonresidential land use.  
Using a fixed effects model, the authors estimate expenditures for a variety of 
public services.  Expenditures are expected to be a function of several broad sets of 
variables, including: characteristics of the built environment which includes density, 
urbanized land area, and the property value; political characteristics of the area such as 
per capita municipal governments, per capita special districts, an indicator of whether the 
county contains the central city; and revenue sources including local tax and 
intergovernmental transfers.  Equations are estimated using twelve different dependent 
variables: per capita total expenditure, per capita spending on capital facilities, per capita 
spending on roadways, per capita spending on other transportation, per capita spending 
on sewerage, per capita spending on trash collection, per capita spending on housing, per 
capita spending on police, per capita spending on fire, per capita spending on parks, per 
capita spending on education, and per capita spending on libraries.   
 Carruthers and Ulfarrson’s parameter estimates for density appear to create 
economies of size for: total direct expenditure, capital facilities, roadways, police, and 
education.  For each of these services, the per capita cost decreases as densities increase, 
with the greatest savings realized in areas with very high densities.  The spatial extent of 
urbanized land is positive and significant in most of the models, indicating that the spread 
of a metro area plays an important role in determining public service expenditure.  
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Property value is significant in 5 of the 12 equations and positively correlated with per 
capita spending for all services except for other transportation and sewers.  Political 
characteristics are significant in most of the equations, suggesting that the formation of 
small general and special purpose governments may work to lower per capita spending.    
Carruthers and Ulfarsson’s results indicate that public service expenditures are 
influenced by the physical pattern of development; average density, urbanized area and 
property value all influence the per capita amount spent on service provision. The 
political structure of metropolitan counties is also found to have an effect; with greater 
fragmentation being associated with lower expenditure.  
Population Growth and Density 
There are two possibilities for the way that population growth might influence 
local public expenditure decisions. On the one hand, large increases in population might 
increase the congestion in the services provided; increased congestion may result in 
higher local per capita expenditures to maintain some desired level of service. If 
however, there are economies of scale in service production, then increasing the 
population works to lower the per capita expenditure costs, as spreading cost among a 
larger number of people will lower the amount spent per capita. Of course, in the 
presence of diseconomies of scale, the opposite effect prevails. A decrease in per capita 
public expenditures may also take place if areas are slow to respond to fast population 
growth; the decline in per capita expenditures may be indicative of decreased service 
levels and/or quality. 
 Population changes may influence the demand function as well; as population 
changes the income, tastes, and preferences of local area residents may be changing. If 
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the preferences of residents change, they might demand not only higher levels or quality 
of services, but a greater variety of public services as well. Of course, it is also possible 
that despite the increased demands for services, local governments are unable to meet this 
demand, and service quality and/or the variety of services provided may fall resulting in 
lower per capita expenditures.  
 Density influences expenditures in a similar manner to population, either through 
the congestion mechanism, or economies of density. Recall that economies of density 
occur when there are cost savings due to higher average density levels. Diseconomies of 
density exist, resulting in rising public service expenditures coinciding with higher 
density levels. In the case of congestion, higher density may lead to increased congestion 
in the provision of public services, resulting in higher expenditures. However, if there are 
economies of density in the production of local services, then costs can be expected to 
fall with increased densities. Because the possibility for either economies or 
diseconomies of density exists, the influence of the density variable on local public 
services is ambiguous and empirical work is necessary to determine the net impact on per 
capita expenditures.  
Buettner, Schwager, and Stegarescu (2004) examine how population and density 
impact public service costs in German states. They estimate cost functions for a large 
number of government expenditure categories for each of the states. There are two main 
contributions from their work: first, the authors distinguish between the different impacts 
of population and density in their empirical framework. Their second contribution is 
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disaggregating public expenditures into a large number of categories38 and analyzing the 
relationship between density and population for each expenditure. Although the impacts 
of density and population differ across the different expenditure categories (as would be 
expected), in the aggregate they find that the per capita cost of public services is constant. 
In other words, they find no fiscal advantage (or disadvantage) for areas of either high or 
low density. They argue that there is no basis for preferential treatment of German states 
based on the cost of providing public services. 
2.C Data and Empirical Model   
 
I estimate the baseline relationships using a cross-sectional model39 of the 
following form, where all variables are expressed in logarithmic form: 
    ei = α + βDCi + γSDi +δXi + εi ,   
where i = 1, …, 273 and represents the MSAs used in the analysis. The regression is run 
separately for each time period. I first focus the analysis on different categories of current 
operating expenditures, and then turn my attention to capital expenditures. ei is the per 
capita expenditure of a particular public service, α is a constant, DCi is a vector of 
explanatory variables representative of the demand, cost, and taste variables from the 
conceptual framework, SDi is a vector of intergovernmental relationship variables and 
represents the division of responsibilities in the conceptual framework, Xi is a vector 
containing the Gini sprawl measure, population (or in one specification, population 
                                                 
38 A total of 40 expenditure categories are examined, ranging from police protection, housing, and 
education to prisons, sports and recreation and welfare.  
39 Although I estimate per capita total expenditures, I follow the previous literature that estimates different 
public services separately.  
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change), and the average density measure, and εi is the residual term. These variables are 
discussed in greater detail below. 
 The relationship between sprawl and the cost of providing a public service is 
likely lagged; that is, expenditures at time t are more likely to be influenced by the level 
of sprawl in a previous time period opposed to the sprawl in the same time period, t. Any 
fiscal response or consequence to changing urban form would not be expected to occur 
instantaneously, and therefore there is more likely to be a lag.  Building the lag into the 
model is possible due to the different availability of the data sources. The expenditure 
data is drawn from Census of Governments data and is available for years ending in 2 and 
7 (e.g. 1992 and 2002) while the sprawl Gini, and many of the other explanatory 
variables are available from decennial Census reports (e.g. 1990 and 2000). This data 
availability allows the sprawl Gini in 1990 (or 2000) to impact the outcome of the 
expenditure variables in 1992 (or 2002). Table 2-2 contains the source notes for the 
variables and Table 2-3 contains the source notes for capital expenditures.  The 
descriptive statistics for current operating expenditures and explanatory variables are in 
Table 2-4 and Table 2-5 contains the descriptive statistics for capital expenditures. 
The data consist of two periods, covering 273 MSAs40 in all areas of the country 
except New England.41 Because the county components of MSAs change over time, it 
was necessary to choose a period on which to base the definition, and the MSA 
                                                 
40 Although data were collected for 306 MSAs, all multi-state MSAs were excluded from the main analysis. 
 
41 The New England MSAs are excluded because their counties are not comparable to the rest of the 
country. MSAs are aggregations of counties, so it was not appropriate to include New England.   
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definitions as of June 30, 1999 were chosen.42 The MSAs were reconstructed for 1990 
based on the 2000 definition. Because the definitions of MSAs change over time, if one 
consistent time period is not used, then a true analysis of how sprawl changes over time 
cannot be measured. For example, the Knoxville MSA had 7 component counties in 
1990: Anderson, Blount, Grainger, Jefferson, Knox, Sevier, and Union. By 1999, the 
Knoxville MSA had only 6 counties, but a number of the component counties had 
changed: Grainger and Jefferson were no longer part of the MSA, and Loudon county 
was added. If the definitions were not consistent across time, an analysis of the Knoxville 
MSA would include 7 counties in 1990 and 6 in 1999, of which only 5 are found in both 
years. A number of potential problems arise from definitional changes. The potentially 
most problematic issue is that any changes in sprawl would not necessarily be due to 
changes in the location of people, but rather could arise due to the addition or removal of 
component counties. Choosing a base year as the definition allows for consistent 
comparisons across time.  
Explanatory Variables 
 
The explanatory variables I use are discussed below; I separate them into 
meaningful categories in order to discuss them in more detail. Following the conceptual 
framework discussed above, I use per capita expenditures for a number of different public 
services as the dependent variables, a vector of explanatory variables that are 
representative of cost, demand and taste variables, a vector of variables representing the 
harshness of the environment, and a vector containing variables representing 
                                                 
42 See http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/metro-city/99mfips.txt  for a complete listing of MSAs 
and their component counties. This was the definition used for Census 2000. 
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intergovernmental relations. Wherever possible, the explanatory variables are chosen to 
be representative of the median voter. A unique aspect of the model is the incorporation 
of the sprawl measure into a fully-specified model of local expenditure decisions. In 
addition to the sprawl measure, I also incorporate average density, population, and 
population change, to separately assess their potential impact.  
The Gini measure of sprawl is based on decennial Census data for 1990 and 2000; 
so the sprawl measure in addition to the majority of the explanatory variables are also 
reported for those years. The numerous expenditure variables are from the Census of 
Governments data for 1992 and 2002. The expenditure categories that I focus on are: per 
capita current operations, per capita education current operations, per capita fire 
protection current operations, per capita police protection current operations, per capita 
highway current operations, per capita waste management current operations, and per 
capita sewer current operations. In addition to the current operating costs, I also gauge the 
influence sprawl has on the costs of capital for selected categories of expenditures.  
Sprawl, Density, Population and Population Change 
 The primary relationships of interest to this study are between per capita 
expenditures and sprawl, density, population, and the percent population change. These 
variables are all proxies for the harshness of the environment, or, in terms of the 
conceptual model presented earlier, are part of the environmental vector, X. Based on the 
earlier discussion of the possible ways sprawl may impact public service costs, I have no 
clear expectation of the sign of the sprawl variable. As discussed previously, the impact 
of sprawl is likely to vary across different public services.  
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  In addition to the sprawl variable, the importance of the average density of the 
MSA is also assessed. Higher average density may increase per capita spending because 
more public goods might be required to provide some predetermined given level of 
output. However, if there are economies of density in the production of public services, 
then per capita costs might fall. According to Ladd (1992; 1994) higher densities 
generally result in higher levels of local public expenditures. Because there are two 
possible outcomes for average density, the expected sign is ambiguous. I calculate the 10-
year population change over the previous decade for each MSA in order to gauge the 
impact of population growth. High population growth may increase per capita public 
expenditures if the population growth increases the marginal cost of providing the 
services. Another possibility is that a surge in population might decrease per capita 
spending if areas are slow to accommodate their new, larger populations. The expected 
sign of the population level is ambiguous, as well. It is unclear how population may 
impact the spending on public services; there are two possible effects the population level 
can exert. For a purely public good, it could reasonably be expected that higher 
populations would result in lower per capita expenditure costs. On the other hand, 
diseconomies of scale could occur, where higher populations may result in higher per 
capita expenditures. 
 One difficulty that arises when discussing local public services and sprawl is that 
local public service expenditure decisions and the distribution of people in an area occur 
at different geographic levels. For example, sprawl can appropriately be conceptualized 
at the MSA level, however, there are no public services delivered at the MSA level. 
MSAs can have numerous governments providing public services, and the 
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responsibilities of these governments vary widely among the MSAs. To reconcile the 
difference between the level at which we typically observe sprawl and the level at which 
local public services are provided, I incorporate an MSA-specific measure of the average 
size of local governments.43 While the population level serves as a proxy for the total size 
of the MSA, the average size of local governments approximates the responsibility of the 
average government within an MSA. The purpose of this variable is two-fold: on the one 
hand it contributes additional information on how the “size” of an area affects local 
public service expenditures. Second, though not an exact measure, this variable proxies 
for the presence of economies or diseconomies of scale for each type of local public 
service.  
Demand, Cost, and Taste Variables 
The next set of variables are used to fully account for the demands, taste, and 
costs that may influence local expenditure decisions. The two variables of primary 
interest here are the per capita income of MSA residents, and the tax price. The tax price 
is the ratio of the average home price to the total value of homes in the MSA.44 The 
income elasticity is expected to be positive, while the price elasticity is expected to be 
negative. The expectations of these signs are consistent through the literature. The 
average wage in the MSA is included as a direct proxy for the input cost of providing 
public services. This variable is the average wage for all non-government jobs, and 
represents the wage that governments would have to pay its employees. Presumably, the 
higher the wage, the higher the cost of an input to the public service, and the higher the 
                                                 
43 The types of governments this variable includes are: county, municipal, township, school district, and 
special districts.  
44 The value of homes is obtained from the long-form Census questionnaire, that asks homeowners to report 
the value of their home for the year prior to the Census.  
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per capita expenditure is expected to be. The per capita number of jobs is used as a proxy 
for the “daytime population” in an area. In other words, the number of jobs relative to the 
population may exert some influence on the expenditures on public service, perhaps in a 
similar manner to the way density may influence expenditures.  
Intergovernmental Relations Variables 
 In each local expenditure equation, a measure of the extent to which local areas 
are responsible for each type of expenditure is included. For each service category, I 
include the state share of spending which is defined as the ratio of state spending to the 
total spending of state and local governments in the state. This variable accounts for the 
relative responsibility of the state government vis-à-vis local governments, and is 
expected to exert a negative effect on local government expenditures. The larger the state 
share, the lower the local responsibility, and therefore the lower the local expenditure. I 
also include the per capita intergovernmental aid from the state and federal government. 
It is expected that the more aid local governments receive the more likely local 
governments are to increase local per capita spending.  
2.D Results 
 
I first estimate the current operating expenditure decision of local governments 
for six different categories of services: education, police, fire, sewer, highways, and 
waste management.  The final dependent variable estimated is total current operating 
expenditures. I estimate a fully-specified expenditure model in a cross-sectional 
framework expanding upon the median voter framework; the results from the regression 
for 1992 are found in Table 2-6; results for 2002 are in Table 2-7. I begin with the 
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discussion of the results of the primary variable of interest, the sprawl Gini measure. 
This variable is negative and significant in 2 of the 7 expenditure equations (police and 
fire) in 1992, and 3 of the 7 equations in 2002 (highways, police, and fire). These results 
indicate that for fire and police protection, more sprawled areas tend to spend less per 
capita on police and fire protection than areas with a lower sprawl value. At first glance, 
these results may seem to run counter to what is known about the service delivery of 
these two services. There are, however, a couple of possible explanations for these 
results. For police, it may be that areas where the population is less concentrated (i.e. 
more sprawl) provide fewer opportunities for crime, and therefore expenditures per 
resident tend to be lower than areas with higher concentrations of its population. 
Throughout the country, many large municipalities support their own police force, while 
smaller cities and rural areas may be served by state police, part-time forces or even 
volunteer officers. So while the cost per resident of police services may fall for more 
sprawled areas, service quality may also be falling.  
The results for how sprawl impacts the expenditures on fire services are a bit 
trickier than public safety, and not as straightforward. First, there is the difference in the 
way areas staff their fire departments. Most often, large cities are protected by paid fire 
departments. Medium-sized cities and areas are often protected by some combination of 
paid and volunteer forces. Rural areas and small communities are usually served by 
volunteer departments.  Each of these different types of fire departments are funded 
differently, with the larger departments usually funded out of a municipal budget, 
volunteer departments supported by either special governments or subscription fees, and 
medium sized departments drawing support from some combination of the above. To 
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further complicate matters, many departments outside of large cities rely on 
uncompensated assistance from other fire departments to deal with some calls. This 
makes service quality look better and costs look lower than they actually are. There are 
also major differences between central city and suburban fire responses. Central cities 
tend to have higher call volume and more major incidents (due to among other factors, 
higher concentration of people and more multi-unit housing) but because they are served 
by full-time paid firefighters the service there tends to be better. Outlying areas tend to 
have fewer fires, but service is typically of lower “quality” because the fire departments 
are broadly dispersed and depend much more heavily on volunteers. For these reasons, 
the results of both police and fire services should be interpreted with caution.  
The elasticity sprawl value for per capita highway expenditures in 2002 is -0.131. 
This result may indicate that in areas where there is less sprawl, the roads do not take as 
much abuse as in areas where there are greater concentrations of people on the roads.  
Sprawl has a positive and significant impact on waste management expenditures 
in both 1992 and 2002, with elasticities of 0.417 and 0.460, respectively. This result 
indicates that more sprawled areas spend more per capita on waste management vis-à-vis 
less sprawled areas, perhaps due to increased driving to pick up waste. The positive 
impact of sprawl on waste management expenditures is also found in Carruthers and 
Ulfarsson (2003), although the authors do not calculate elasticities so the magnitude of 
the impact cannot be compared.   
Previous empirical studies have not examined a sprawl measure, but rather used  
an average density measure, often as a proxy for sprawl. As discussed above, however, 
sprawl and average density are expected to exert separate influences on local public 
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expenditures, and so should be analyzed separately. Average density is negative for 
highway current operations in both time periods, positive for fire in both time periods, 
and positive for sewer expenditures in 2002. The sign for the highway equation indicates 
that in areas with higher average densities, per capita expenditures are lower than in 
areas where densities are lower. While at first, this result may seem to contradict the 
results for sprawl and highway expenditures, recall that sprawl and average density are 
not accounting for the same phenomenon in an area. This result, in fact, shows that it is 
important to account for both average density and sprawl in the analysis of local public 
expenditures, as each measure can exert a different effect. Areas with higher average 
densities spend more per person on sewers vis-à-vis areas with lower average densities. 
This result may come about because it may be costlier to provide sewer services to areas 
that have more people per square mile than areas with fewer people per square mile, 
perhaps because of greater system use and higher costs to maintain the system. 
Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2003) did not find average density to have any impact, and 
Buettner et al (2004) did not look at sewer services.  
Another variable of interest to the current study is the average size of 
governments within an MSA; this variable is significant in five equations in 1992 and in 
all seven equations in 2002. As expected, the signs of the elasticities vary depending on 
the category of service, but results are consistent across categories for each year.  
Economies of scale are found for the following services: per capita highway 
expenditures, per capita education expenditures, and sewers (but only for 1992). The 
results for highways and sewers are consistent with the results discussed in Fox and 
Gurley (2006) and Hirsch (1970). The result for education is a bit surprising, however, in 
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a review of several studies Hirsch finds that education expenditures are found to be 
either U-shaped or with constant returns to scale. The elasticities for education for 1992 
and 2002 are relatively small (-0.046 and -0.047), respectively, and do not likely indicate 
large cost savings. One possible explanation for this result is that in general, many MSAs 
are in the downward-sloping portion of the average cost curve for education.  
Diseconomies of scale are found for: total per capita expenditures, fire, police, 
and waste management. The elasticities for total per capita expenditures are small in 
2002 (0.029).  Labor intensive public services such as fire and police can reasonably be 
expected to have increasing costs as the number of people increase. Compared to sewer 
systems or highways, waste collection is also fairly labor intensive which likely results 
in the large elasticities for each year (0.385 in 1992 and 0.389 in 2002.)  
The share of the population age 25 and over with at least a bachelor’s degree and 
the average wage both are generally positive, and the average number of jobs in an MSA 
is negative although only in a few equations. MSAs with a greater share of their 
population who have at least a bachelor’s degree have higher per capita total 
expenditures in both 1992 and 2002, higher per capita expenditures on fire services and 
sewers in 2002, and higher per capita police expenditures in 1992. The results for this 
variable conform to the idea that higher levels of education in a population influence the 
taste for public services; the positive (yet small) elasticities confirm this theory.  The 
average number of jobs is negative for total current operations, fire, and highways, with 
small elasticities compared to many of the other variables. Ladd (1992) finds that the 
number of jobs has a negative impact in a few of her specifcations, as well. 
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Most of the variables chosen to represent the median voter behave as expected. 
The state share of state and local total current operating expenditures is negative and 
statistically significant in four of five regressions in both 1992 and 2002, with elasticities 
ranging from –0.213 to -0.794.45 This result indicates that the greater the reliance on the 
state portion of the state and local total, the less the responsibility local areas have and 
the lower the dollar amount spent per capita. The tax price is negative and significant in 
two of the seven equations in 1992 and negative and significant in only one equation in 
2002. The elasticities for tax price range from -0.096 (for education) to -0.760 (for 
sewers). The tax price variable was not significant in Ladd (1992; 1994); and the ad hoc 
approaches of Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2003) and Buettner et al (2004) do not use a tax 
price variable.   
 Per capita personal income is positive and significant in 4 of the 7 equations in 
1992, and in 3 of the 7 equations in 2002. The elasticities range from 0.212 (total current 
operating expenditures) to 0.918 (fire services).  Other than the relatively low elasticity 
for total current operating expenditures, the elasticities for the income variable are 
consistent with previous surveys of empirical studies of the median voter model. The 
intergovernmental aid variable is positive and significant in five equations in 1992 and 
six equations in 2002. The elasticities for the aid variable are generally lower than those 
for per capita personal income; indicating that although grant money received by the 
MSA from both state and federal governments does increase local spending, on average 
it has less of an effect than an equal increase in personal income. However, in 1992, the 
                                                 
45 No state money is given to local areas for fire services, so the state share of the total is not included for 
fire. Several areas did not have reliable data for the state portion of waste management services in 1992, so 
the state share is not included in this equation for either year.  
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elasticity of the aid variable exceeds the elasticity of the personal income variable, 
lending some evidence that the flypaper effect is at work.46   
The MSA population level is not significant in any equation in 1992 and negative 
in only one equation in 2002 (sewer). This result might indicate that as population 
increases areas experience economies of scale in sewer services, as costs are spread out 
over a greater number of people, and mirrors the result obtained by Borcherding and 
Deacon (1972). Because this variable is only significant in one equation in one time 
period, in the next section I examine how population change rather than the level impacts 
local spending decisions.  
Capital Expenditures 
 The focus thus far has been on operating expenses. However, sprawl may also 
potentially impact capital outlays; as people spread out geographically and residential 
areas become less concentrated, local areas may have to increase expenditures to ensure 
sufficient capital facilities. The data on capital outlays from the Census of Governments 
is a measure of gross investment, not the annual cost of capital. Therefore, the results 
below should be used with caution, as the estimates are not meant to be interpreted as the 
annual cost of using capital, but rather how the explanatory variables described above 
influence gross capital investment in a number of service categories during a given year.  
 I examine three categories of capital expenditures in addition to the total. The 
categories I focus on are: education, sewer, and waste management. I choose sewer and 
waste management these are capital expenditure categories where one might expect 
                                                 
46 The flypaper effect represents the idea that grants to local governments tend to increase local 
expenditures more than an equivalent increase in per capita personal incomes. See Fisher (1982) and 
Turnbull (1997) for more on flypaper effects on local expenditures. 
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sprawl to have an impact. Capital education expenditures are included because, as a 
general rule, education is the largest category of local expenditures and the one residents 
are most likely to be concerned with. I generally find that the median voter model is not a 
good predictor of capital expenditures, with relatively few significant variables in each 
time period. This is not terribly surprising, as the theoretical model is less appropriate for 
annual capital expenditures than current operating expenditures. The results for capital 
expenditures in 1992 are found in Table 2-8 for 1992 and in Table 2-9 for 2002. The 
variables that are significant, however, generally display the expected signs and are of 
reasonable magnitude. As with current operating expenditures, the primary variable of 
interest is the sprawl Gini. In 1992, the sprawl Gini is negative for sewer capital and 
positive in 2002 for education. These results appear to indicate that higher levels of 
sprawl increase per capita spending on education facilities, perhaps because as people 
locate further out, in less concentrated areas, the need for educational facilities increases. 
The opposite result occurs for sewers, which may show that sprawl does not increase the 
capital outlays for sewer systems. However, because these statistically significant results 
occur in only one time period, caution should be used before making policy 
recommendations based on these results. Average density is negative in both years for 
total capital expenditures, a result that somewhat mirrors Ladd’s (1992) results, although 
the empirical approaches differ. Despite the results showing that more sprawled areas 
spend less per capita in a couple of service categories, these results should be interpreted 
cautiously. Because this data measures gross investment, if instead the annual cost of 





 To check the robustness of the results, I make a number of changes in the next set 
of regressions. First, I replace the sprawl Gini with different proxies for sprawl; the Index 
of Dissimilarity and the Sprawl Indicator discussed at length in the previous chapter. The 
results of each of these in each of the regression equations are quite similar to those using 
the sprawl Gini. The Index of Dissimilarity is negative for fire and police in 1992. In 
2002, the elasticity for fire and police is negative, while the elasticity for education is 
positive. The results using the sprawl indicator are remarkably similar in both time 
periods to those obtained using the Index of Dissimilarity in 2002. The results for these 
regressions are in Tables 2-10 through 2-13. Comparisons of the elasticities of the 
different sprawl measures for 1992 and 2002 are found in Table 2-14 and Table 2-15, 
respectively. The elasticities for the Index of Dissimilarity are slightly higher than for the 
sprawl Gini, while the sprawl index is slightly lower than the sprawl Gini. In all cases, 
however, the results are reasonable compared to the Gini measure indicating that the 
results of the model are robust to different sprawl measures.  
 I next estimate the original equations using the sprawl Gini, but replaced the 
population level with the population change. It is possible that while the level itself does 
not exert much influence on public service expenditures, population change may have an 
influence. As discussed above, large increases in population may increase the congestion 
in the provision of services; more congestion may result in higher local per capita 
expenditures to maintain the desired level of service. If this is the case, then per capita 
expenditures will rise as population increases. In the presence of economies of scale in 
service production, increases in population lower per capita expenditure costs, as 
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spreading cost among a larger number of people lowers the amount spent per capita. Of 
course, in the presence of diseconomies of scale, the opposite effect prevails. A decrease 
in per capita public expenditures may also take place if areas are slow to respond to fast 
population growth; the decline in per capita expenditures may be indicative of decreased 
service levels and/or quality. 
 The variable of interest here is the population change variable, the results for this 
specification are found in Tables 2-16 and 2-17. In 1992 this variable is positive and 
significant in three equations (highway, police, and sewers) and in 2002 positive and 
significant for police. The elasticities tend to be small (ranging from 0.047 for highways 
to a high of 0.116 for sewers), particularly compared to the elasticities of per capita 
income, per capita aid, and the average wage. Except for very slight changes in the 
coefficients, the sprawl results remain unchanged from the baseline results.  
Alternative Modeling Strategies 
 Although there are only a few empirical studies examining per capita local public 
service expenditures, most are estimated in a cross-sectional framework. Only one 
previous paper, Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2003), estimates per capita expenditures in a 
panel framework, and to my knowledge, no previous study has employed a panel 
framework using anything other than an ad hoc approach. In this section I test the 
conceptual model drawn from the median voter model outlined above using a fixed-
effects panel model.  
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 The results of the fixed-effects panel model are in Table 2-18.47 The results of the 
fixed-effects framework in general are similar to the cross-section results, many of the 
median voter variables behave as expected, although with limited significance. The 
sprawl measure is only significant in the sewer equation, and is negative. Average density 
is negative and significant in two equations, education and police; the elasticity for 
expenditures on police is comparable to the result found in 1992. These results may 
indicate that despite the supposedly negative fiscal impacts, sprawl does not have quite as 
much influence as is commonly perceived, especially when examined in the context of a 
multi-year panel, rather than in a cross-section.   
Sprawl and Density Interaction 
 Although the specifications discussed above address the separate influences that 
density and sprawl may have on local public service expenditures, it is also possible that 
the interaction between sprawl and density may exert an impact not picked up by these 
two variables alone. Using the sprawl Gini, I estimate the baseline model for current 
operating expenditures from above, incorporating the density/sprawl interaction term. 
The results for these regressions are in Tables 2-19 and 2-20. The results indicate that the 
inclusion of the interaction term causes both density and the sprawl Gini fail to be 
significant in a number of public service categories, while many of the other variables 
retain their explanatory power. In joint significance tests, I fail to reject the null at the 1% 
level, indicating that sprawl, average density, and the interaction of the two are jointly 
                                                 
47 The Hausman specification test is the accepted test to compare the results of the consistent fixed effects 
model with the efficient random effects model. The null hypothesis is that the unobserved effects with the 
other regressors. In the presence of such correlation, the estimators from the random effects model will be 
biased, so the fixed effects model is preferred. I reject the null at the 1% level of significance, indicating 
that the fixed effects model is statistically the appropriate choice.  
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significant for fire, police, sewer and highway expenditures. These variables are jointly 
insignificant, however, for total current operating expenditures and education current 
expenditures. This outcome further illustrates that the impact of sprawl depends on the 
particular public service  
2.E Conclusions  
 
 Several conclusions can be reached from the results of this research. First, for a 
number of expenditure categories, neither sprawl nor average density play a role in 
raising public service expenditures. The lone exception is in the case of per capita 
expenditures on waste management, where higher levels of sprawl lead to higher 
expenditures. This result mirrors that of Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2003) and shows that, 
perhaps, in the case of certain types of services, the distribution of people in a local area 
does matter, and greater concentration of residents within an area may lead to cost 
savings. However, the main conclusions of this research is that other than for waste 
management services, sprawl’s impact on local public service expenditures is rather 
small, especially when compared to a number of other factors. 
 In addition to sprawl, I have tested how a number of factors may influence local 
public service expenditure decisions, and have found the common perception that sprawl 
raised expenditures to be unsubstantiated. Even in the cases where sprawl does influence 
expenditures, the elasticities tend to be quite small; exerting a much smaller influence 
than a number of other factors. 
 The variables representing cost, taste and demand have varied impacts, but overall 
conform to predictions from the literature. The important result of this work, is that for 
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nearly all categories of expenditure variables, sprawl has either no or very limited 
influence on per capita local public spending. This is potentially an important conclusion, 
in particular for local areas and policy-makers; it is possible that attention can be directed 
to other possible outcomes of sprawl not addressed in this research.48 This conclusion, 
however, should be interpreted with caution; this research was performed at the aggregate 
level, and perhaps sprawl does play a role when local public services are disaggregated to 
a sub-MSA level. Also, despite my attempts at addressing the robustness of the results to 
different  measures of sprawl, the concept of sprawl can mean different things to different 
people. It is possible that a different set of proxies for sprawl could have potentially 
different results.  
Attempting to capture the different impacts of average density and sprawl is 
another important component of this research; these two variables were found to have 
different impacts on fire expenditure categories, and sprawl was found to be a significant 
factor while average density had no influence in a number of categories: police, waste 
management, highways, and sewers. Previous studies have found that either in general, 
average density doesn’t matter (Carruther and Ulfarsson (2003); Buettner et al (2004)), or 
that it increases expenditures but only at very high densities (Ladd (1992)).  The current 
research falls into the former category; for the majority of local public expenditures, 
average density has no influence. The results of this research contribute to the ongoing 
debate as to whether sprawl increases local public expenditures; and my results tend to 
suggest that sprawl has limited influence on local public service expenditures. 
                                                 
48 Examples include the potential relationships between sprawl and health, air and water quality, and 
perhaps other qualitative outcomes that were not the focus here. 
 
 118
 There are a number of possibilities for future research. Reconciling the different 
levels of geography at which sprawl and local public services are delivered should be a 
priority of future research. As noted previously, sprawl takes place at the MSA level, 
while local public services are delivered at a sub-MSA level. It is possible that some of 
the impacts on local public services may be masked when aggregated to the MSA level. 
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Table 2-1: Correlation Coefficients between Sprawl, Density and Population 





1.000    
Average Density 
 
0.091 1.000   
Population 
 
-0.132 0.455 1.000  
Percent population 
change 









Per capita current operating expenditures-total n/a Census of Governments 1992, 
2002 
Total current operating expenditures 
for the MSA, divided by the MSA 
population 
Per capita current operating expenditures -education n/a Census of Governments 1992, 
2002 
Current operating expenditures on 
education for the MSA, divided by the 
MSA population 
Per capita current operating expenditures-police n/a Census of Governments 1992, 
2002 
Current operating expenditures on 
police for the MSA, divided by the 
MSA population 
Per capita current operating expenditures-fire n/a Census of Governments 1992, 
2002 
Current operating expenditures on fire 
for the MSA, divided by the MSA 
population 
Per capita current operating expenditures-sewer n/a Census of Governments 1992, 
2002 
Current operating expenditures on 
sewer for the MSA, divided by the 
MSA population 
Per capita current operating expenditures-highway n/a Census of Governments 1992, 
2002 
Current operating expenditures on 
highways for the MSA, divided by the 
MSA population 







n/a Census of Governments 1992, 
2002 
Current operating expenditures on 
waste management for the MSA, 
divided by the MSA population 
Gini Coefficient 





+/- U.S. Census Gazetteer Files-
2000 
1990 Census of Population and 
Housing Public Law File 94-
171-1990 
 
MSA population (1000s) +/- U.S. Census Summary File 1- 
2000, 1990 







Average Density +/- U.S. Census Summary File 1- 
2000, 1990 
Total population in the MSA divided 
by the square miles in the MSA 
MSA area (1000s square miles) +/- U.S. Census Summary File 1- 
2000, 1990 
Square miles in the MSA 
Percent population change +/- Caluclated from U.S. Census 
Summary File 1-2000, 1990 
10 year population change in the MSA 
Per capita personal income (1000s) + BEA, 2000, 1990 Total personal income in the MSA 
divided by total MSA population 
Per capita aid 
 
+ Census of Governments 1992, 
2002 
Total intergovernmental revenue from 
Federal and State source, divided by 
the MSA population 
State share of  state and local expenditures-total - Census of Governments 1992, 
2002 
State share of total state and local total 
expenditures for each state. 
State share of  state and local expenditures-education - Census of Governments 1992, 
2002 
State share of total state and local 
expenditures on education for each 
state. 
State share of  state and local expenditures-police - Census of Governments 1992, 
2002 
State share of total state and local 
expenditures on police for each state. 
State share of  state and local expenditures-highway - Census of Governments 1992, 
2002 
State share of total state and local 
expenditures on highway for each 
state. 
State share of  state and local expenditures-sewer - Census of Governments 1992, 
2002 
State share of total state and local 
expenditures on sewer for each state. 
State share of  state and local expenditures-
wastemanagement 
- Census of Governments 1992, 
2002 
State share of total state and local 
expenditures on waste management for 
each state. 
Average government size in the MSA 
 
+/- Census of Governments 1992, 
2002 
MSA population divided by  total 
government entities in MSA, including 
county, municipality, township, school 
district, and special district. 
Percent of the population with at least a bachelor’s degree 
 
+ Census Summary File 3- 2000, 
1990 
Percent of the population over age 25 




+  Total amount paid in salaries divided 
by total number of jobs in the MSA 
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Per capita expenditures-total capital n/a Census of Governments 
1992, 2002 
Total expenditures on capital 
divided by total MSA 
population 
State share of state and local total capital 
expenditures 
- Census of Governments 
1992, 2002 
State share of total state and 
local expenditures on total 
capital for each state. 
Per capita expenditures-education capital n/a Census of Governments 
1992, 2002 
Total expenditures on 
education capital divided by 
total MSA population 
State share of state and local education 
capital expenditures 
- Census of Governments 
1992, 2002 
State share of total state and 
local expenditures on 
education capital for each 
state. 
Per capita expenditures-waste 
management capital 
n/a Census of Governments 
1992, 2002 
Total expenditures on waste 
management capital divided 
by total MSA population 
State share of state and local waste 
management capital expenditures 
- Census of Governments 
1992, 2002 
State share of total state and 
local expenditures on total 
waste management capital for 
each state. 
Per capita expenditures-sewer capital n/a Census of Governments 
1992, 2002 
Total expenditures on sewer 
capital divided by total MSA 
population 
State share of state and local sewer capital 
expenditures 
- Census of Governments 
1992, 2002 
State share of total state and 
local expenditures on total 




Table 2-4: Descriptive Statistics 
  1990 2000 
Variable Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum 



































Per capita current 
operating expenditures-
education .8394435    .2060185           0 1.670014 1.284616      .3068018          0 2.484893 
Per capita current 
operating expenditures-
police .1014347    .040849    .0086379    .2779249 
 
.1612206     .0563142    .0604458   .4279159 
Per capita current 
operating expenditures-fire .0515462    .0216698    .0006907    .1385231 .0790971      .031714    .0009122   .2166426 
Per capita current 
operating expenditures-
sewer .0439044    .0215373           0    .1421782 .0682446     .0331101    .0085275   .3417383 
Per capita current 
operating expenditures-
highway .0665334    .0288275    .0064737    .1936409 .0918047      .039779 .0104306   .2151594 
Per capita current 
operating expenditures-
waste management .0351595    .023735    7.56e-06    .1693706 .0503584     .0303273    .0002121   .1594961 
Gini Coefficient 0.259 0.100 0.038 0.504 0.270 0.102 0.0352   0.541 
Index of Dissimilarity 0.376 0.115 0.913 0.615 0.388 0.117 0.112 0.671 
Sprawl Index 0.225 0.093 0.033 0.532 0.227 0.093 0.035 0.455 
Percent population change 
 0.145 0.164 -0.098 0.947 0.125 0.109 -0.081 0.507 
MSA population (1000s) 
 
612 1,048 57 8,863 700 1,174 58 9,519 
Average Density 
 
378.653 909.244 4.501 11,846.96 424.616 999.174 5.412 13,043.78 
MSA area (1000s square 
miles) 
 
2.262 3.288 0.047 39.369 2.262 3.288 0.047 39.369 
Per capita personal income 
(1000s)  
14.536 2.513 6.726 24.941 22.762 3.907 11.007 40.669 
 
 128
  1990 2000 
Variable Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 
Per capita aid 
 
0.584 0.227 0.139 1.691 0.955 0.337 0.171 2.178 
State share of  state and 
local expenditures-total 
 0.403 0.064 0.306 0.606 0.426 0.065 0.328 0.785 
State share of  state and 
local expenditures-
education 0.280 0.070 0.166 0.471 0.278 0.076 0.169 0.999 
State share of  state and 
local expenditures-police 0.849 0.0548 0.627 0.936 0.849 0.07 0.623 0.985 
State share of  state and 
local expenditures-fire 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
State share of  state and 
local expenditures-highway 0.443 0.148 0.198 0.873 0.438 0.146 0.162 0.891 
State share of  state and 
local expenditures-sewer 0.009 0.021 0 0.120 0.020 0.039 0 0.262 
State share of  state and 
local expenditures-waste 

















Table 2-5 Capital Expenditure Descriptive Statistics 
 
  1992 2002 
Variable Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Per capita capital 
expenditures-total  
 0.312     0.164 0.039   1.425 0.515     0.229 0.082    1.519 
Per capita capital 
expenditures-education 
 0.089    0.054         0    0.256 0.181      0.095           0   0.672 
Per capita capital 
expenditures-utilities 
 0.049     0.068           0    0.682 0.065       0.079         0 0.568 
Per capita capital 
expenditures-waste 
management 0.006    0.011           0    0.077 0.005       0.007          0 0.046 
Per capita capital 
expenditures-sewer 
 0.029     0.035          0    0.246 0.035      0.043       0 0.422 
State share of  state and 
local capital expenditures-
total   0.405     0.070  0.288    0.601 0.436    0.064    0.348    0.777 
State share of  state and 
local capital expenditures-
education 0.281     0.070 0.166    0.472 0.278     0.076   0.169    0.999 
State share of  state and 
local capital expenditures-
utilities  0.069     0.204 0    0.812 0.074      0.201           0 0.904 
State share of  state and 
local capital expenditures-
waste management 0.098      0.100           0 0.594 0.106       0.104          0 0.689 
State share of  state and 
local capital expenditures-





































 Per Capita 
Current 
Operations 























State share of state 

























































































































































































Adjusted R square  0.526 0.594 0.599 0.307 0.569 0.351 0.137 
n 273 272 273 273 273 156 273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  































 Per Capita 
Current 
Operations 























State share of state 























































































































































































Adjusted R square  0.520 0.597 0.463 0.246 0.592 0.292 0.162 
n 273 272 273 273 273 156 273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 

















































































































































Adjusted R square  0.300 0.136 0.287 0.099 
n 273 272 156 273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 2-9: Regression results for Capital Expenditures, 2002 






























































































































Adjusted R square  0.300 0.259 0.171 0.044 
n 273 272 156 273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 












 Per Capita 
Current 
Operations 























State share of state 






















































































































































































Adjusted R square  0.527 0.594 0.598 0.323 0.566 0.350 0.139 
n 273 272 273 273 273 156 273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
































 Per Capita 
Current 
Operations 























State share of state 























































































































































































Adjusted R square  0.520 0.598 0.464 0.251 0.591 0.294 0.167 
n 273 272 273 273 273 156 273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 













 Per Capita 
Current 
Operations 























State share of state 























































































































































































Adjusted R square  0.526 0.560 0.600 0.309 0.583 0.341 0.124 
n 273 272 273 273 273 156 273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 2-13: Regression results, Alternative Sprawl Measure, Sprawl Indicator, 2002 
 
 
 Per Capita 
Current 
Operations 























State share of state 























































































































































































Adjusted R square  0.521 0.602 0.456 0.258 0.594 0.295 0.165 
n 273 272 273 273 273 156 273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 



















































































































































































































 Per Capita 
Current 
Operations 























State share of state 
























































































































































































Adjusted R square  0.529 0.640 0.580 0.283 0.568 0.349 0.120 
n 273 272 273 273 273 156 273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 2-17: Regression results with Population Change Variable, 2002 
 
 
 Per Capita 
Current 
Operations 























State share of state 
























































































































































































Adjusted R square  0.507 0.617 0.449 0.242 0.601 0.262 0.139 
n 273 272 273 273 273 156 273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 









 Per Capita 
Current 
Operations 























State share of state 







































































































































































































R square within  0.938 0.959 0.587 0.484 0.844 0.750 0.245 
n 273 272 273 273 273 156 273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 2-19: Regression results with interaction term, 1992 
  Per Capita 
Current 
Operations 























State share of state 









































































































































































































Adjusted R square  0.527 0.597 0.599 0.312 0.578 0.356 0.147 
n 273 272 273 273 273 156 273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 









 Per Capita 
Current 
Operations 



















Per Capita Waste 
Management 
Current Operations 
State share of state 






































































































































































































Adjusted R square  0.524 0.603 0.471 0.255 0.597 0.293 0.162 
n 273 272 273 273 273 156 273 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







 Julie Lynn Marshall was born May 18, 1976 in Long Beach, California. She graduated 
from Los Alamitos High School in Orange County, California and moved to Knoxville, 
Tennessee to continue her academic career at the University of Tennessee. In May 1999, she 
received her B.A. with a major in environmental studies and a minor in botany. Julie then 
entered the Graduate School at the University of Tennessee, where in May 2001 she earned her 
M.A. in economics. Julie continued on with her studies in pursuit of a Ph.D. in economics. She 
accepted an offer from the Joint Committee on Taxation, in Washington, D.C. beginning in the 
summer of 2008, after completing her Ph.D.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
